CHAP, x "SCIENCE OF ETHICS" 105 



requirement, duty is now tested from the point of 

 view of the individual consciousness ; when a gulf dis- 

 closes itself between the individual life and the social 

 whole. We live in an irrational world ; for our nature 

 craves and postulates happiness; and, although some- 

 times when we deserve it we get it, yet often we have 

 to do without. Better look facts in the face ! There is 

 no more to be said. The timid man will obey morality 

 as a sort of insurance policy, he will be moral on the 

 chance that immorality may be punished. But often 

 the bold man will play a recklessly speculative game 

 heavy risks, great profits. If he succeeds, how can you 

 prove to him that he chose wrongly? The "idiot" 

 may have been quite right from his own point of view. 

 So much for the " Science of Ethics ! " The Christian, 

 too, admits that our moral nature lays down great 

 postulates, to which experience does not always conform. 

 But we look to the future for the recompense of reward 

 not " so much pleasure for so much goodness," but a 

 larger life, and the " wages of going on and not to die." 



It will clear our thoughts if we compare Mr. Stephen 

 with his predecessors. 



First, with Comte. In some respects Mr. Stephen 

 seems to be the legitimate heir of Comte, especially in 

 regard to the biological appeal. Stephen's thinking is 

 guided throughout by the biological analogy, and he 

 is able to throw fuller light upon it by the modern 

 evolutionary conception of infinitesimal changes which 

 maintain a moving equilibrium. Like Comte again, 

 and unlike Spencer, he definitely identifies morality 

 with the claim of society upon the individual in con- 

 trast with all individual claims or wishes. But here 

 the likeness to Comte ceases. First of all it is perhaps 



