126 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART in 



a long way in certain directions. With admirable faith- 

 fulness Mr. Alexander reports that conscience passes its 

 judgments on willed conduct only on willed conduct ; 

 yet scarcely is this admitted when free-will is mockingly 

 expelled from the court unheard free-will, the one 

 further truth which gives meaning and justification to 

 our human habit of passing judgment only upon will. 

 Why is free-will exiled ? What procured this order 

 from the judge ? Morality did not require it ; conscience 

 asked nothing of the kind; victorious prejudice, and 

 the tyranny of physical science, carried the day. That 

 is not the way to provide our subject with a scientific 

 frontier ! It results in a haphazard frontier pushed 

 far on, at one point, to suit the requirements of our 

 own position, but then cut short to suit the requirements 

 of other people across the border. Mr. Alexander is 

 loyal to the psychological fact that we judge only 

 willed conduct ; he takes care to report it accurately ; 

 but what does he make of it ? Stated in isolation, is it 

 not meaningless ? 



We see now in how restricted a sense moral facts 

 are admitted by Mr. Alexander. The moral conscious- 

 ness is allowed to bear testimony ; " AB is an ethical 

 conception" ; " CD is an ethical conception" but that 

 is all. The authority of conscience is good to that ex- 

 tent and not an inch beyond. If we ask the further 

 question, what is the meaning of this ethical conception 

 AB? Conscience falters and grows embarrassed, or 

 remits the matter for analysis to the laboratory of 

 ethical science. From this point onwards conscience is 

 dumb, and Mr. Alexander acts as its proxy, or works 

 up, as he judges good, the material with which it has 

 furnished him. 



This criticism must not be misunderstood. We 



