CHAP, xin DARWINISM IN ETHICS ALEXANDER 131 



speaking of equilibrium as the moral end, if he likes to 

 do so. Following his own lead we might hint that a 

 different formula did fuller justice to the real contents 

 of the moral end ; but we should not condemn his 

 formula as false. 



A very different light, however, is thrown back 

 upon this definition from the second part of Mr. 

 Alexander's treatise. In it we learn that there are 

 many competing and successive types of morality 

 endlessly many. Goodness is not one, in contrast to 

 the multitudinousness of evil and disorder. Goodness 

 itself is no less protean. We must not hold that 

 morality is the equilibrium of conduct ; each type of 

 morality is an equilibrium. Without forestalling our 

 discussion of the theory of moral progress, we notice 

 now the bearing of this assertion not simply on the 

 theory of moral order but on the very definition of 

 morality. It had been proposed that we should define 

 morality as equilibrium. That definition is now robbed 

 of its meaning. Is there any conduct at all which may 

 not be said to seek an " equilibrium " if only that of 

 the simple equation, " Let me be on the top and every 

 one else below " ? Matters are not improved but rather 

 made worse when the word " compromise " slips out as 

 a synonym for "equilibrium." Is not almost every- 

 thing a compromise from some point of view? The 

 extortioner, the slayer of human lives, the cheat, 

 " when he thinks of his opportunities," may, like Clive, 

 be "astonished at his own moderation." You and I 

 both claim something ; half to me and half to you is a 

 compromise ; but ninety-nine per cent to me and one 

 per cent to you is also a compromise. I may even per- 

 suade myself that a hundred per cent to me is a com- 

 promise, because I suffered you to get away with unrifled 



