132 COMTE TO BENJAMIN K1DD PART in 



pockets. What possible light then is obtained by naming 

 good conduct " a compromise " ? A further objection 

 remains. " Compromise " is the worst possible word for 

 describing moral behaviour. Morality, as Mr. Alexander 

 bears witness, imposes a law, and that law requires uncon- 

 ditional obedience. If we follow it out, our own nature 

 will blossom into its true richness and fulness ; but 

 for this the knife is as necessary as the watering-can ; 

 the path to moral self -development lies through self- 

 sacrifice. Where is there room for talking of compro- 

 mise in such a process ? The law indeed gives his due to 

 each man, and also to each impulse. The " stern law- 

 giver " wears " the Godhead's most benignant grace " ; 

 but no wrangling of private interests, no arbitrary 

 delimitation of incompatible claims, will produce 

 morality. In a word, morality involves order, equili- 

 brium, peaceful settlement of competing claims ; but 

 equilibrium and still more plainly, compromise 

 neither includes nor leads to morality. Seek the 

 higher and the lower will be added. Seek the lower 

 you lose all. We conclude therefore that Mr. 

 Alexander's theory is neither true nor false but merely 

 vague. 



The second half of the treatise deals with moral 

 progress. The most interesting and novel part of this 

 discussion is found in a doctrine laid down when 

 treating of the origin of moral distinctions ; but, as 

 there seems to be no reason why the doctrine should 

 only be applied to the beginnings of moral progress, 

 we shall treat it as covering the whole field. It sets 

 before us a vision of competing moral ideals, and of 

 the survival of the fittest. The process is illimitable ; 

 there is no absolutely best ; every good, while it 

 is valid, or to those for whom it is valid, is also 



