CH. xvii METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL SELECTION 173 



presence of purpose and its successful realisation were 

 expected. A train is meant to carry me safely to my 

 journey's end that is purpose. Instead of doing so it 

 runs off the rails ; the natural forces set to work were 

 imperfectly known or imperfectly controlled. That is 

 accident, not purpose. Neither the passengers nor the 

 company's servants designed that result. When a 

 young rough puts a stone upon the track, and wrecks 

 a train, that is not " accident," though by a natural 

 extension of the term we may call it so. That is not 

 chance, but wicked purpose. It is crime. 



Darwinism does not exactly assert chance in this 

 sense, although it may seem to do so. Apparently 

 Darwin himself believed that he had destroyed the 

 evidence in support of purpose or design in nature. 

 J. S. Mill too, looking at the new doctrine, thought that, 

 if it were established, it would substitute chance for 

 design. The evidence for the latter would go to pieces 

 on the " plurality of causes." But even if Darwinism 

 should be held to destroy teleology, such a view involves 

 using the word "chance" in a sense markedly different 

 from that in which we have defined it above. Chance 

 or "accident" in human life means partial failure of 

 purpose through man's weakness or ignorance partial 

 failure standing out in sharp relief against a background 

 of habitual success. He aimed, as he always does, but 

 he missed the mark this time. That is what we mean 

 (so far) when we say " the disaster was due to chance " ; 

 " he had a dreadful accident yesterday." There is no 

 full parallel between this and Darwin's wholesale denial 

 of teleology in nature. There ivas no one to take aim, 

 hints Darwin. 



Moreover, it is not enough to deny teleology. It is 

 necessary, if you are to carry weight, that you give a 



