174 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART in 



plausible explanation of the fact that nature mimics 

 purpose. Darwin has given such an explanation. 

 What part does chance play in it ? 



If we cannot fully interpret chance by a reference 

 to telic purpose, we must bring it into relation with 

 efficient causation or causal law, as we ordinarily phrase 

 it ; efficient cause, or that scientific conception of cause 

 which stands nearer to efficiency than to any other of 

 Aristotle's " causes," having well-nigh monopolised the 

 name of cause in the minds of modern men. 



The assertion of chance will now imply either (l) 

 mere blind causal law, in opposition to purpose, or 

 else (2) mere blind coincidence of several unconnected 

 laws or forces. 



The phrase is often used in the first sense in de- 

 nunciation of Materialism. Did mere blind causal law, 

 it is asked, did the mere law of matter blunder into 

 mind? This, however, could not be Darwin's sense. 

 He denied purpose ; but it was not at all his affair to 

 disparage causal law. Besides, it is not the case that 

 any one cause (not being a mental "First Cause") can 

 be said to account for living species. " Natural selec- 

 tion," the supposed creator of distinct "species," is a 

 group of many different causal factors, curiously en- 

 tangled with each other. 



We are driven then upon the last sense. A chance 

 is a coincidence. Series A and Series B cross each other 

 at one point, and affect each other unexpectedly it 

 may be, grievously. They are distinct things; but 

 they "happen" to have their existence side by side 

 in the same universe ; presently they " happen " to 

 exchange their formation side by side for a hostile 

 formation, front against front, and there is a collision, 

 it was an accident ! The wind that blew over the 



