CH. xvn METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL SELECTION 183 



to destroy the teleological argument for the being of 

 God. But (3) partial absence of purpose. While all 

 the other processes of plant or animal life are purposeful, 

 variation moves at random. 



Darwin we say assumed this. He did so when he 

 called the entire process Natural Selection. If varia- 

 tion itself were (to any extent) purposeful, progress 

 would not depend entirely upon the selecting agency ; 

 but Darwin's nomenclature implies that indirect selec- 

 tion is the only cause of progress. He had invented a 

 theory which would account for evolution even if varia- 

 tions were non-purposeful. It was natural to slip into a 

 habit of speaking as if variations had been proved to 

 be non-purposeful. But that had not been proved. 

 Nothing had been proved about variations. And 

 so long as we are without laws of variation, it is 

 very hard to define the meaning and bearing of 

 Darwinism. 



For example, the general bearing of use-inheritance is 

 naturally defined thus : it will give the same results 

 with natural selection, only more rapidly. But in 

 speaking so one assumes, what is habitually assumed, 

 and never proved, that variation is casual, i.e. non- 

 advantageous (in itself and on the average). If it 

 turned out that variation moved even in part along the 

 lines of evolutionary change, then Darwinism or even 

 Hyper - Darwinism might warrant the hope of rapid 

 progress. Hence it is extraordinarily difficult to bring 

 to the test of experiment the questions between the 

 Lamarckians and the Weismann school. One glides 

 into the habit of thinking that it is mainly a question 

 of pace. And yet quick pace, if it were proved, might 

 not be a presumption in favour of Lamarckian use- 

 inheritance. It might only point to a neglected element 



