CH. xvii METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL SELECTION 189 



serves as a warning. We must not go to use-inheritance 

 for the direct production of new qualities in the organism, 

 miracle fashion, by an alien environment. In a sense, 

 use-inheritance is a more teleological theory than natural 

 selection ; yet it may be subordinated to the most ex- 

 tremely mechanical philosophy, if in " use " environment 

 is held to be active and the organism itself passive. 



Kegarding Darwinism and chance then we have 

 decided as follows : First, Darwinism asserts chance 

 (coexistence) in the same way in which [finite] science 

 ordinarily asserts it, by a mechanical view of the uni- 

 verse ; secondly, Darwinism has also assumed the possi- 

 bility of random [non- purposeful] variations ; and on 

 analysis this seems to point back once more to the 

 same scientific assumption of distinct co-operating 

 forces. So far then as Darwinism really or necessarily 

 implies chance, it is not discredited as a science among 

 sciences. All of them do something similar. There are, 

 of course, farther questions as to the ultimate validity 

 of the scientific analysis, but these questions belong to 

 the domain of philosophy. Thirdly, however, Darwin's 

 phrase, "natural selection," lays greater stress upon the 

 element of chance than his own facts warrant. He 

 speaks as if the eliminating agency of a disconnected 

 environment were the one thing valuable. In a sense 

 he may be said to have made it probable that an element 

 of chance (coexistence) enters into the evolutionary pro- 

 cess. But that gives him no right to say that evolution 

 is " due to " chance coexistence. A spark, along with 

 fitting proportions of oxygen and hydrogen, produces 

 water ; but you would throw little light upon the nature 

 of water by isolating one of the factors in its production, 

 and by describing the liquid as " due to " a spark. Salt 



