CH. xvn METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL SELECTION 211 



VII 



The view now sketched of natural selection that it 

 is a real force, but strictly limited has been outlined 

 in a spirit of sympathy with idealistic philosophy. 

 Yet it is opposed to the views of several distinguished 

 Hegelian idealists. Some of them would say that it goes 

 much too far in commendation ; others, not far enough. 



Professor Ritchie endorses natural selection without 

 putting any limit to its application. It seems to give 

 him all that he needs. There is evolution in Darwin, 

 and there is evolution in Hegel ; therefore natural 

 selection accounts for everything, or at least it does 

 so mutatis mutandis. We have tried to show in 

 detail what the mutation is, and it is pretty extensive. 



(On the other hand, Professor Ritchie, as social 

 philosopher, takes the opposite view, holding that 

 reason has transformed the whole evolutionary process 

 which it has touched.) 



Dr. Stirling and Mr. Sandeman, if I understand 

 them rightly, regard natural selection as a piece of 

 showy but flimsy thinking, that crumbles away as you 

 handle it. They would deny that it explains anything, 

 or that it applies to any part of the cosmos. 



Mr. Sandeman 1 believes thoroughly in the teleo- 

 logical character of organisms, and finds every existing 

 species too perfect and harmonious and balanced to 

 think of "bettering itself." Instead of the realistic 

 vision of cosmic horrors, he has a poet's vision of peace. 

 He is not content with excluding absolute unfitness, 

 but insists on denying even relative unfitness. " What- 

 ever is, is right." It exists, it has survived ; it 



1 Problems of Biology. 



