CHAP, xix HYPER-DARWINISM IN SOCIOLOGY 245 



one-sided intellectualism, which had prevailed even in 

 quarters l where we find but little faith in reason. 



Granting all this, and granting it gladly, one must 

 go on to express grave distrust of the process by which 

 Mr. Kidd reaches his conclusion ; of the terms in which 

 he formulates it ; and of the affirmations with which it 

 is connected. 



First, even if we accepted the claim that biology 

 was to be the final judge, we must regard Mr. Kidd's 

 Weismannism as a very insecure foundation. We have 

 already noted in some detail how the denial of use- 

 inheritance had been qualified and weakened and trans- 

 formed by its author even before Mr. Kidd applied to 

 Weismannism for a social gospel. And we have seen 

 that the doctrine of necessary regress in the absence of 

 struggle and consequent advance is a precarious deduc- 

 tion from Weismann's own premises, and is scarcely 

 necessary to Mr. Kidd's sociological system. 



Hitherto, however, we have considered only one form 

 of Mr. Kidd's dependence on biology. 2 So far, we have 

 spoken of his doctrine concerning men qua physical 

 organisms, exposed to the same conditions as other 

 living creatures. A different use of language by Mr. 

 Kidd must now be considered. His further doctrines 

 regarding reason and religion are brought into connection 

 with biology by means of the familiar phrase, the social 

 organism. True, Mr. Kidd thinks that other writers 

 who have used this phrase have led us very little, if at 

 all, further on. Still, it points us in the right direction, 

 and the new guide is confident of securing better results. 



1 e.g. Mill and Buckle. See below, in the closing paragraphs. 



2 Professor Lloyd Morgan shows very tellingly that Mr. Kidd 

 is not warranted by any facts he adduces in contrasting man's intellectual 

 and his moral evolution (Habit and Instinct, p. 345). Yet another part 

 of the case therefore breaks down. 



