248 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART iv 



unselfishness too becomes possible as it never was 

 before ; it has a new significance. Keason has broken 

 up the unity of the life of sense. Does it do nothing 

 except break it up ? At the lowest, is reason not shrewd 

 enough to perceive the unhappiness of a selfish life, the 

 greater gain to oneself of a life animated by unselfish 

 and far-reaching interests ? 



Something must be added here regarding the use 

 of the word reason by Mr. Kidd and Mr. Balfour. 

 Eeason is narrowed by them to reasoning, and even 

 (pace Mr. Balfour) to rationalism. Mr. Balfour's foot- 

 note seems to be dealing Coleridge a sly hit when it 

 repudiates acquaintance with the Logos. Now no 

 doubt Coleridge had a provoking habit of exclaiming 

 " Logos " as if it were a talisman of magic power. We 

 have seen something similar in our own day on the 

 part of that very able and powerful and now venerable 

 Hegelian writer, Dr. Hutchison Stirling. In his case, 

 "the Notion" was the talismanic word. Mr. Kidd 

 again goes straight to Kant, 1 by whom, of course, 

 Coleridge was influenced. But Kant is very obscure. 

 Some provocation had then been offered the plain 

 Briton. And the way in which the doctrine of Reason 

 or Logos shaped itself with Kant or with Coleridge 

 in many points alike; in many points, also, not alike 

 was open to further criticism. Every doctrine of 

 " faculties " is, to a large extent, artificial. Reason 

 and Understanding shade into each other, however we 

 may choose to contrast them. 



But, just on that account, the plain Englishman 

 will find it hard to keep clear of the deeper and more 



1 Without reporting him very accurately. Grave objection might be 

 taken to the formulation of each of the three great Kantian positions 

 given by Mr. Kidd. 



