258 COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD CHAP. 



morals as the laws of social welfare ; Mr. Stephen 

 would add, versus individual welfare. No proof is 

 given that we must do so. 



Again, part of Professor Alexander's theory falls 

 under this head, viz. the definition of goodness as 

 equilibrium. Here a certain amount of proof is offered 

 us, viz. indirectly, in the form of hostile criticism of 

 rival naturalistic theories ; along with which we have 

 Mr. Alexander's assurance that the measure of truth 

 contained in idealistic ethics is incorporated in his own 

 formula. We see no possible reason to forbid the 

 assertion that goodness is an equilibrium, it is in the 

 farther working out of his views that Mr. Alexander 

 seems to compromise the interests of morality. But 

 we remain unconvinced that " equilibrium " is either 

 the best or the only definition of moral excellence. 



Secondly, we have evolution still without vital 

 incorporation of the conception of struggle in Mr. 

 Herbert Spencer, but now applied not simply by way 

 of "analogy" to the "social organism," but also 

 and emphatically to the whole cosmic process, 1 society 

 included. At least, that is the effort of Mr. Spencer's 

 philosophy. In its . working out, as we noted, it falls 

 short of its aim, giving us rather a sequence of distinct 

 evolutions in different regions. And for the guidance of 

 conduct Mr. Spencer does not keep steadily to the 

 suggestions furnished by cosmic evolution, but varies 

 his standpoints, and sets before us no fewer than three 

 ideals. 



Thirdly, we have the Darwinian doctrine of struggle ; 

 and we take it for the moment as applied by way 



1 If Spencer is biological at all, it is in conceiving the universe itself 

 as an organism. But that organism, by the definition, has no environ- 

 ment ! 



