Foreword 



of reasoning. The monistic philosophy does not neces- 

 sarily imply the conception of the Self as a mere cellular 

 complex, it even (as we shall see) agrees better with the 

 opposite concept of its central unity. 



If, abandoning for the moment all metaphysical 

 ideas on the constitution of the individual, we keep 

 strictly to the data of fact, we are confronted with a 

 leading verity: there are in the individual different 

 modalities * of energy, and these modalities, even though 

 theoretically conceivable as proceeding from a single 

 energy, are not equivalent. 



There are in the living being 'material energy,' 

 * dynamic energy,' as it may be termed, and * psycho- 

 logical energy ' ; and these modalities of energy appear 

 to us to be both distinct in themselves and graded with 

 respect to each other. Such are the data of fact. 



Starting from these verified facts we can, without 

 losing our way among metaphysical notions, conceive of 

 the living being in two different ways. 



The first sees the individual only as a complex of 

 partial and elementary individualities. In this concept, 

 the apparent grades observable in a living being, are 

 simple functions of orientation and relative position. 

 This is the classical concept. 



The second sees the individual as a complex yet 

 more complex, in which the elements form autonomous 

 and distinct cadres a graded hierarchy. These cadres 

 or hierarchic series are not, let us repeat, necessarily 

 different in essence; but they have different activities 

 and capacities, or if the expression is preferred, are at 

 different evolutionary levels. 



We may thus conceive of a dynamic and psychological 

 complex above the material and organic complex, 

 organising and centralising it; which psychological 

 complex might itself be capable of rational sub-division 



1 Modalities = modes in the logical sense, distinguishing between 

 various modes. 



38 



