CHAPTER III 



PSYCHOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALITY 



THE bankruptcy of the classical concept of physiological 

 individuality has now been demonstrated. We shall 

 next show that the classical psychological concept is 

 equally defective. 



It is based on two principal notions: 



1. The notion of the Self as a synthesis of states of 



consciousness. 



2. The notion of the close dependence of all that 



constitutes a thinking being on the functions 

 of the nervous centres. 



These two essential propositions will now be 

 successively examined. 



I. THE SELF CONSIDERED AS A SYNTHESIS OF STATES 



OF CONSCIOUSNESS 



In succession to the physiological concept quoted 

 from M. Dastre (Ch. I.), let us consider the psychological 

 concept which we borrow from M. Ribot. 1 



The organism, and the brain which is its supreme 

 representation, are the real personality, containing in 

 itself the remnants of what we have been and the 

 possibilities of what we shall be. The individual 

 character in its entirety is inscribed there, its active 

 and passive aptitudes, its sympathies and anti- 

 pathies, its genius, its wisdom, or its foolishness, its 

 virtues and its vices, its torpor or its activity. That 



1 Ribot : Les Maladies do la Personnalitt. (Italics are Dr Geley's.) 



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