From the Unconscious to the Conscious 



be uncertain to its view, and the future, like the past, 

 would be present to its eyes.' 



What does M. Bergson object to in this ? That 

 we cannot eliminate Time : * Nothing in all our experi- 

 ence is more unquestionable than Duration. We 

 perceive duration like a river which cannot change its 

 flow. It is the foundation of our being, and, as we are 

 well aware, the very essence of things with which we 

 are in relation.' 



This objection is certainly insufficient: if Time and 

 Space are but illusions of our limited understanding, it 

 is obvious that these illusions may be imposed on our 

 understanding without therefore ceasing to be illusions. 



It seems, then, to be true that mechanical or teleo- 

 logical metaphysics can neither be demonstrated nor 

 refuted, because they are outside our modes of reasoning. 

 Nevertheless they seem to receive unexpected support 

 by the facts of prophetical lucidity, and a certain number 

 of these facts are well established. 



But even admitting the abstract and metaphysical 

 possibility, this theory brings no concrete addition to 

 the doctrine of evolution. Questions of transcendental 

 ends and means are inseparable from consideration of 

 the Absolute. It is above our intelligence, and cannot 

 be discussed to any profit. We must be content to 

 admit the necessity for a single evolutionary principle 

 containing within itself all evolutionary possibilities, 

 and merely endeavour to understand how these possi- 

 bilities come into realisation. 



Now it is quite certain that the classical naturalistic 

 pantheism, or Monism, does not aid us here. 



' This supreme law of Nature,' writes Haeckel, 

 * being laid down, and all other laws made subord- 

 inate to it, we have convinced ourselves of the 



1 Haeckel : The Riddle of the Universe. 



