From the Unconscious to the Conscious 



to intuition. . . . Thought, that is to say, reasoned 

 knowledge, judicial deliberation, and sincere demon- 

 stration in a word the proper and normal use of 

 reason is disliked: a supreme contempt is pro- 

 claimed for rational philosophy; meaning by that, 

 all the series of linked and logical deductions which 

 characterise the work of previous philosophers. 



' Then, when the dose of impudence is sufficient, 

 and encouraged by the ignorance prevailing in these 

 times, we shall soon hear something of this sort: 

 " it is not difficult to understand that the ' manner- 

 ism ' which consists in enunciating a proposition, 

 giving the reasons which support it and similarly 

 refuting its antithesis, is not the form under which 

 truth should be presented. Truth is the movement 

 of itself by itself." ' 



By whom is this biting apostrophe ? 



No doubt, it will be thought to be one of Mr 

 Bergson's detractors, criticising the philosophy of 

 ' Duration.' . . . Not at all : it is Schopenhauer on 

 Hegel. 1 



But the question of the novelty and the originality 

 of the Bergsonian ' intuition ' is a quite secondary matter. 

 Let us, for the moment, admit the novelty and content 

 ourselves with a valuation of the method by what it 

 teaches us. Our iudgment will go by the results 

 obtained. 



If it is demonstrated that the teachings of M. 

 Bergson's are of value only within the limits within 

 which they can be checked by facts; that when they 

 go beyond facts they are insufficient or erroneous, that 

 will suffice to prove that the * Bergsonian intuition ' has 

 no special validity. 



It will then be no longer permissible to contrast the 

 intuitive to the scientific methods. It will be established 



1 Schopenhauer : Parerga et Paralipomena. 

 175 



