Prom the Unconscious to the Conscious 



characterises animal evolution! Then, in order to 

 palliate the insufficiency of the former idea, he makes it 

 a superhuman faculty, which nevertheless, is still only 

 instinct. 



He rejects the control of the intelligence in philoso- 

 phical matters, but then finds himself obliged to have 

 recourse to some kind of super-intelligence, different 

 from intelligence itself. 



He contrasts intuition and intelligence, but by most 

 subtle reasoning, endeavours to bring them into unity; 

 he places the criterion of truth in the intuition controlled 

 by intelligence which is at the same time vivified by 

 the intuition; so that in the last analysis the intuition 

 is both advocate and judge. 



He denies to logic the right to know that which 

 deals with life and high philosophical problems, but 

 in his work erudition and reasoning take a very pro- 

 minent place. 



He invents a new metaphysical entity ' duration,' 

 but it so happens that this entity is founded on that 

 which is least certain, most subjective, and most relative 

 to our understanding the concept of time! 



The inexactitudes are yet more serious; through 

 them M. Bergson's work leads to a vague idealism an 

 idealism which does not express itself frankly and 

 clearly. 



Difficulties seem eluded rather than solved. The 

 old contradictions are not reconciled by a higher synthesis, 

 which, whether true or not, might at least be precise; 

 they are (we must venture to say) subtilised under 

 confused and plastic formulae. 



This quasi-systematic lack of preciseness causes the 

 earnest reader of M. Bergson's work to feel a discomfort 

 which neither his genius nor his skill can dispel. It is 

 hard to know whether one perceives the truth through a 

 mirage, or is simply the dupe of illusion and paradox. 

 The impression that remains is that of a splendid but 



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