From the Unconscious to the Conscious 



3. THE SELF CONSIDERED AS ESSENTIALLY A DYNAMO- 

 PSYCH ISM 



Is the Self distinct from its representations ? Where 

 is the Self apart from its representations ? Until now 

 the answers to these questions could only be of a meta- 

 physical nature. 



Let us consult the facts alone and see what they 

 tell us. 



Taking into account only facts the question takes 

 shape as follows. 



Is the Self, as taught by classical psychology, the 

 sum of the states of consciousness, or is it separable ? 

 Can it be conceived of as separate from those states of 

 consciousness ? 



We shall see that the answer is not in doubt the 

 Self is not to be confused with states of consciousness. 

 But a certain effort is needful before this can be under- 

 stood. We can admit without much difficulty that the 

 Self cannot be identified with the material body, but 

 it is much more difficult not to identify it with the 

 mentality. It is much less easy to distinguish oneself 

 from the mental, than from the organic representation. 

 This can be done only by modifying our habitual and 

 inveterate intellectual habits, and by applying the whole 

 power of reason to get beyond the Cartesian axiom 

 ' I think, therefore I am,' and to admit another ' I 

 am, even apart from my thoughts; they represent me, 

 but my mental representations are not the whole of 

 Myself.' 



Nevertheless facts prove that nothing is more certain. 

 The induction is exact : if the Self were but the sum of 

 states of consciousness it would be incomprehensible 

 how, these states of consciousness being intact, the 

 Self, which is by the hypothesis their synthesis, could 

 lose that which is most essential and important the 



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