208 THE GRANGER MOVEMENT 



to fix by law maximum rates of charges for ferries, common 

 carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, 

 etc., and that such regulation had never been considered as 

 necessarily depriving the owner of property without due process 

 of law. The basis of this right of regulation is to be found in 

 the fact that the property in question has been devoted to a use 

 in which the public has an interest and is therefore subject 

 to be controlled by the public for the common good. It then 

 remained to consider whether the business of warehousemen in 

 Chicago was one in which the public had such an interest as 

 would justify its regulation by the state. After pointing out 

 its great extent and importance, the large number of people 

 affected by it, and the fact that it might be a virtual monopoly, 

 the court reached the conclusion that " if any business can be 

 clothed ' with a public interest and cease to be juris privati 

 only/ this has been." 



The attorneys for the warehousemen had insisted that, even 

 admitting the public interest in the business, the owners were 

 entitled to a reasonable compensation for the use of their prop- 

 erty and that what is reasonable is a judicial and not a legislative 

 question. To this the court replied that the practice had been 

 otherwise, and that if the right to regulate existed at all, it 

 implied the right to fix maximum charges. " We know that 

 this is a power which may be abused, but that is no argu- 

 ment against its existence. For protection against abuses 

 by legislation, the people must resort to the polls, not to the 

 courts." 



In answer to the objection based upon the power of Congress 

 to regulate interstate commmerce, it was admitted that the ware- 

 houses might incidentally become connected with interstate 

 commerce; but it was declared that " certainly until Congress 

 acts in reference to their interstate relations the state may 

 exercise all the powers of government over them, even though 

 in so doing it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside 

 its immediate jurisdiction." Finally the remaining objection, 

 based upon section 9 of Article I, of the federal constitution, 

 was brushed aside with the remark that the section in question 



