FOOD CONTROL 



3237 



FOOD CONTROL 



Food Control. Organization 

 and husbanding of supply and an 

 equitable distribution of essential 

 foods. The outbreak of the Great 

 War involved all the Powers en- 

 gaged in serious difficulties with 

 regard to food supplies. As the Al- 

 lied blockade proved more effec- 

 tive, it became clear that Germany 

 and Austria must depend on their 

 internal resources, and that these, 

 insufficient even to meet a normal 

 demand, must inevitably diminish 

 as time went on. As early as 1916 

 central offices existed for their 

 effective control. * 



As soon as scarcity developed, it 

 became extremely difficult to in- 

 duce the peasants to part with the 

 food they produced, and in spite of 

 the most drastic administrative 

 measures the German country dis- 

 tricts fared better than the towns. 

 Milk was throughout the war an 

 urgent problem, the farmers being 

 reluctant to submit to strict ration- 

 ing of that commodity and to regu- 

 lations that laid down the propor- 

 tion that might be converted into 

 butter and cheese. 



In Britain the problem was 

 different, because that country de- 

 pends more on imported foods" In- 

 crease in the area of arable land and 

 close supervision of agriculture 

 with a view to increased production 

 were an essential part of policy, 

 but the real danger was that the 

 submarine campaign might cut the 

 country off from oversea supplies. 

 The first crisis arose in connexion 

 with sugar. The production of beet 

 sugar in Germany, Austria, Russia, 

 and other countries to a large ex- 

 tent ceased, thus making Britain 

 and the importing countries almost 

 entirely dependent upon cane 

 sugar. A sugar commission was 

 therefore formed for its collective 

 purchase. National security de- 

 pended on bread, and the responsi- 

 bility for the purchase of wheat, 

 flour, and other essential cereals 

 was placed upon the royal com- 

 mission on wheat supplies, which 

 bought in the country of origin. 

 The Submarine Campaign 



As the submarine campaign 

 developed, the situation became 

 more grave. Ships had to be used 

 as economically as possible, and it 

 gradually became a question of 

 limiting the import of foodstuffs to 

 essentials, and of buying food from 

 the nearest sources. Thus, on ac- 

 count of the shortness of the 

 journey many foods had to be pur- 

 chased from America which could 

 have been more economically pur- 

 j chased in Australia and New Zea- 

 ' land, and Australian wheat, pur- 

 chased by the Government, re- 

 mained on the quays at Sydney. 

 This position only developed 



slowly, and it was not until the end 

 of 1917 that drastic steps for the 

 control of food were taken. 



A food controller, with extensive 

 powers under the Defence of the 

 Realm Act, was appointed at 

 Christmas, 1916, but the main 

 energies of his department were at 

 first devoted to exhortations to 

 economy. By the following sum- 

 mer it was evident that more was 

 required, and Lord Rhondda took 

 office with instructions to tackle 

 the question at the root. 



The fundamental principles on 

 which he worked formed the basis 

 not only of his own policy but of 

 that of his successors. They were : 

 (1) to secure essential bulk sup- 

 plies, if necessary by Government 

 purchase ; (2) to secure priority of 

 tonnage for essential foods ; (3) 

 to prevent an undue rise in prices 

 by fixing maximum prices at each 

 stage between the producer or im- 

 porter and the consumer of all 

 essential foodstuffs, allowing a 

 reasonable profit based on pre-war 

 figures to producers and distribu- 

 tors ; (4) the elimination of specu- 

 lators and unnecessary middlemen, 

 and the supervision of local distri- 

 bution by local authorities. 

 Securing Supplies 



The first and most urgent ques- 

 tion was the securing ot sufficient 

 supplies, leaving a margin for acci- 

 dents, such as the sinking of a food 

 cargo or the destruction of a food 

 store by aircraft or by fire. Then 

 the price paid overseas for these 

 supplies had to be kept down in 

 spite of feverish bidding from other 

 countries. Happily the American 

 food administration was very 

 efficient, and by its efforts Ameri- 

 can production was enormously in- 

 creased. The British Government 

 themselves purchased Australian 

 and New Zealand meat, the greater 

 part of which was used for the 

 army and navy, and at one time 

 took the' whole output of New 

 Zealand butter and Canadian 

 cheese, handing over the quantities 

 not required for the forces for dis- 

 tribution to recognized traders. 

 The purchase of wheat and sugar 

 by the wheat and the sugar com- 

 missions steadied markets and en- 

 sured supplies. The board of trade 

 bought meat and cheese for the 

 army and navy. The oilseeds trade 

 was organized so that, although a 

 large proportion of the small 

 amount of margarine consumed 

 had previously been imported, it 

 was possible to provide a full ration 

 of home-produced margarine. 



All this necessitated some re- 

 strictions on traders, most of 

 whom were licensed by the ministry 

 of food and had to act under 

 orders. There were two possible 



methods : (1) to set up a bureau- 

 cratic control regulating every de- 

 tail of import or purchase and dis- 

 tribution ; (2) to constitute trade 

 organizations representing various 

 sections of the trade, and to en- 

 trust the carrying out of the 

 necessary regulations to trade 

 committees. The latter method, or 

 a compromise between the two, 

 was adopted as the exigencies of 

 each case dictated. Generally 

 speaking, it was found that the 

 price to the consumer could not be 

 regulated without having some 

 form of control reaching back to 

 the original sources of supply. 

 Government Purchase 



This was the reason for the 

 Government purchase of some 

 foods, and the unified purchase of 

 others by trade committees acting 

 under Government instructions. 

 For the very extensive purchases 

 made in the U.S.A. it was found 

 necessary to set up Allied com- 

 missions for buying to prevent the 

 forcing up of prices by Allied bid- 

 ding, and to meet the difficulty of 

 financing purchases hi America. 



But the world shortage of sugar 

 made the continuance of sugar con- 

 trol essential, and the world sup- 

 plies and price of wheat made it 

 necessary to continue this control 

 also. In the case of wheat, the im- 

 ported price had risen from 36s. 4d. 

 in 1912 to 55s. or 60s. in 1920; 

 while home-produced wheat, or- 

 dinarily sold at about 2s. below im- 

 ported wheat, stood at over 70s. 

 In 1917 the loaf was artificially re- 

 tained at 9d. for political reasons at 

 the cost of a subsidy varying from 30 

 to 50 millions sterling. It was there- 

 fore impossible to relinquish the 

 control of wheat and of wheat sup- 

 plies unless the Government were 

 prepared to see the loaf rise in pro- 

 portion to the price of wheat. In 

 April, 1920, this subsidy was re- 

 duced, not abolished, and after that 

 date bread was not subject to a 

 controlled maximum price. The 

 result was the 4 Ib. loaf costing 

 Is. In October, 1920, the subsidy 

 was further reduced, thus raising 

 the cost of the loaf to Is. 4d. In 

 Dec. the price was reduced by $d. 



In Germany and Austria ex- 

 treme scarcity had brought into 

 being an army of people who made 

 it their business to evade the food 

 regulations. In the United King- 

 dom the numerous rules and regu- 

 lations were, on the whole, faith- 

 fully observed, and food remained 

 accessible to the poor. In France 

 there was not the same willingness 

 on the part of merchants, shop- 

 keepers, and the general public to 

 submit to regulations, so control 

 was less effective. See Rationing. 

 Margaret Bryant 



