HA1G 



HAIG 



took part in all the earlier battles, 

 passing in Jan., 1915, to the com- 

 mand of the 1st army. In Dec., 

 1915, he succeeded Sir John French 

 as commander-in-chief of the 

 British forces in France, and held 

 this position till the close of the 

 war. On Jan. 1, 1917, he was 

 promoted field - marshal ; and in 

 1919 he was created earl and re- 

 ceived a grant of 100,000 from 

 the nation. He married in 1903 

 the Hon. Dorothy Vivian, daughter 

 of the 3rd Lord Vivian, and a son 

 and heir was born to him in March, 

 1918. His two daughters were 

 born in 1907 and 1908. 



Haig, like Petain, had the 

 gift of calm and resolution in 

 the darkest hours, and he was 

 by nature an optimist. In Feb., 

 1917, in an interview, he con- 

 fidently predicted an early victory 

 of the Allies, and this pronounce- 

 ment was much criticised at the 

 time, though but for the un- 

 expected collapse of the Russians 

 all his hopes should have been 

 fulfilled. He was constitutionally 

 shy, another point in which he re- 

 sembled Petain, and he could 

 never address his troops, and was 

 indeed little seen by them. , , 



In the crisis of the first battle of 

 Ypres (Oct. 31, 1914), when .all 

 seemed to be giving way, he was 

 suddenly seen riding down the 

 Menin road under a heavy fire, 

 perfectly apparelled with a per- 

 fectly turned-out escort, behaving 

 in that emergency with an un- 

 ruffled calm which had an elec- 

 trical effect. Under his eyes the 

 line was re-formed, the 2nd 

 Worcesters stormed and recovered 

 Gheluvelt, and Ypres was saved. 



In the battle of Loos (Sept. 25, 

 1915) he commanded the 1st 

 British army, which delivered the 

 principal attack, and was criticised 

 for the failure to throw in the re- 

 serves promptly and for the small 

 results obtained. Such mistakes 

 were probably inevitable until ex- 

 perience in large scale warfare 

 had been gained; before 1914 no 

 British general had handled more 

 than 30,000 men in a body, and 

 at Loos some 250,000 were engaged. 



After Haig received the com- 

 mand in France, he had to prepare, 



in conjunction with Joffre, the 

 plans for a great offensive in 1916 

 on the Somme front.(^ The policy 

 contemplated was attrition, as at 

 that date there were no means of 

 delivering a surprise attack or of 

 turning the enemy's position. The 

 plan as adopted was not Haig's ; 

 he had wished to attack the for- 

 midable Beaumont-Hamel ridge 

 from the N. and from Arras, but, 

 owing to difficulties of cooperation, 

 the French were against this. 

 Haig's thoroughness of organi- 

 zation was seen in the admirable 

 completeness of the preparations 

 for this attack, which involved 

 enormous engineering work. The 

 losses of the British in the Somme 

 battles were terrible (400,000), but 

 the Germans suffered as severely. 

 No decisive blow could be inflicted 

 till the German reserves were ex- 

 hausted, and the artillery pre- 

 paration required at that date to 

 cut wire rendered the terrain 

 almost impassable. 



Successes in 1917 



Haig in 1917 was required to act 

 under Nivelle's directions, which 

 hampered his operations, but he 

 gained the two brilliant victories 

 of Arras and Messines, though all 

 his arrangements were upset by the 

 necessity of prolonging his attack 

 at Arras, in order to take the pres- 

 sure off Nivelle, whose offensive 

 had failed. Thus the third battle 

 of Ypres did not open till July 31, 

 when the good weather had gone ; 

 it involved fearful suffering and 

 sacrifices for the troops, but it came 

 very near being a complete victory. 



The first battle of Cambrai was a 

 remarkable success, though it 

 could not be exploited because of 

 the diversion of troops by the 

 British Government to various sub- 

 sidiary fields, and because of the 

 dispatch of five divisions to Italy. 

 Haig had been a believer in tanks, 

 and they were to provide him with 

 a weapon capable of restoring the 

 factor of surprise and eliminating 

 the prolonged artillery preparation. 



In early 1918 Haig was con- 

 vinced of the imminence of a 

 great German offensive, but could 

 not persuade the British Govern- 

 ment of the soundness of his view. 

 His removal from the command 

 was considered, but fortunately 

 was not carried out. He was left 

 with infantry effectives 114,000 

 below strength, nor could he in- 

 duce the home authorities to send 

 him reinforcements from Palestine 

 and the secondary fields. With 

 his weak force, his front was ex- 

 tended 28 miles in Jan., to the 

 Oise ; and owing to his lack of 

 men he was compelled to station 

 his reserves north of the Somme. 

 When - the German offensive 



