MORHANGE 



553O 



MORHANGE 



reserve divisions. The two armies 

 acted independently under the 

 orders of French headquarters. 

 On Dubail's right was Pau's army 

 of Alsace with a total strength of 

 eight divisions. The German 

 forces on this front from right to 

 left consisted of troops from the 

 5th German army and the Metz 

 garrison, Prince Rupert's 6th 

 army of five corps from Chateau- 

 Salins to Sarrebourg, and Heer- 

 ingen's 7th army in the Vosges, 

 three corps strong. The French had 

 a total of about 24 divisions to 20 

 or 21 German divisions, or a force 

 of about 470,000 to 400 : 000 men. 

 The German strategy in this 

 quarter was to stand on the defen- 

 sive and draw the French upon a 

 strong and prepared position run- 

 ning from Delme, S.E. of Metz, 

 through Morhange, Benestroff, and 

 N. of Sarrebourg, to the Vosges. 

 Here trenches had been construct- 

 ed with concrete machine-gun and 

 artillery positions, and barbed wire 

 had been laid. The terrain over 

 which the French would attack 

 had been carefully surveyed and 

 the ranges marked. In fact, the 

 French were about to throw them- 

 selves upon a great fortress system, 

 the flanks of which were secured by 

 the permanent defences and heavy 

 artillery of Metz and Strasbourg. At 

 the right moment the Germans pro- 

 posed to assume the offensive and 

 advance towards the gap of 

 Charmes, where there was a break 

 in the French system of barrier 

 forts covering the eastern front. 



The two French armies at the 

 outset advanced without difficulty, 

 pushing back strong rearguards 

 near the frontier. On Aug. 17 the 

 French left entered Chateau -Salins 

 and the right reached St. Quirin. 

 Next day the French left was S.W. 

 of Morhange and the right entered 

 Sarrebourg. The French now found 

 that they had in front of them a 

 prepared position, strongly held. 

 On Aug. 19 on the right Dubail 

 attacked with only one division in 

 the direction of Sarraltroff, N. of 

 Sarrebourg, but was immediately 

 brought to a standstill by fire from 

 the German entrenchments. On 

 the left Castelnau attacked with 

 the 15th corps towards Benestroff, 

 ' but was speedily stopped in the 

 same way, and the fire of the Ger- 

 man heavy artillery, to which the 

 French field guns could make no 

 satisfactory reply, had an unfortu- 

 nate moral effect on the French 

 troops. The 20th corps (Foch) on 

 the extreme right attempted with- 

 out suecess to advance on Morhange. 

 Both French generals decided to 

 renew their attack on the 20th. 

 That day Prince Rupert issued 

 the order to his troops, " we must 



cCo 



Pont-a- 



BATTLE OF 

 MORHANGE 



1914 



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WfL R R A I N E 



Fortified Zones 



German Territory 



occupied in French 



Advance 



French Territory 

 occupied in German 

 Counter Stroke 



Morhange. Map showing extent o! Fiench advance and German counter-stroke 

 in the battle of August, 1914 



now advance ; our moment has 

 come." On the extreme right, 

 Dubail was heavily attacked, but 

 gained some ground. Near Sarre- 

 bourg, his troops stormed Gosselm- 

 ing, but were then driven back by 

 the fire of the German heavy artil- 

 lery and by the attack of the Ger- 

 man infantry, who recovered Sarre- 

 bourg in the afternoon. On the 

 left, where Castelnau attacked 

 with three corps from Bisping to 

 Morhange, terrible losses were sus- 

 tained, as the French infantry as- 

 saulted without proper artillery 

 preparation. The 16th corps was 

 forced back from Bisping ; the 15th 

 corps, attacking towards Benes- 

 troff, was heavily repulsed, and 

 then violently counter-attacked. In 

 these operations the Germans made 

 skilful use of their previous minute 

 survey of the whole terrain and 

 their superiority in artillery. 



The 20th corps on the left had 

 been ordered to maintain an ex- 

 pectant attitude, but it attacked 

 precipitately, dashing on the Ger- 

 man line at Morhange and W. of 

 that place, where, after sustaining a 

 terrific fire, it was counter-attacked 

 by two German corps and driven 

 back to Chateau-Salins. At the 

 same time the Germans developed a 

 violent attack against the extreme 

 French left flank N. of Nancy, with 

 troops moving from Metz between 



the Seille and Moselle. This move- 

 ment was the more dangerous be- 

 cause, if it succeeded, the French 

 front would be broken and the 

 French troops E. of Nancy in peril of 

 being driven up against the Alsace 

 frontier. Fortunately the Germans 

 were checked, but they bombarded 

 Nomeny and destroyed it. 



During the battle Dubail re- 

 ceived orders from Joffre to send 

 his trains S. of the Meurthe, " in 

 view of grave changes in the gene- 

 ral situation in Lorraine and of the 

 possibility of danger to his left 

 flank." He was further instructed 

 not to delay in attempting to de- 

 fend a front which could be easily 

 penetrated. Thus the limited suc- 

 cess which he had gained on his 

 right was of no advantage. Castel- 

 nau's army was in extreme danger ; 

 some of its divisions had lost half 

 tneir infantry, and exercising a 

 wise initiative he decided to break 

 off the offensive and carry out an 

 immediate retreat. The French 

 were, compelled to retire behind the 

 Meurthe, abandoning Luneville 

 and an important part of French 

 Lorraine ; on Aug. 23, they reached 

 the Grand Couronne positions, 

 covering Nancy with their left, 

 while their centre held the gap of 

 Charmes and their right St. Die and 

 the Vosges, near the Col de Ste. 

 Marie-aux-Mines. The Germans 



