POLIZIANO 



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POLIZIANO 



the field. The first theory is one of 

 dualism. Each of the great entities 

 known respectively as Church and 

 State has its own distinct province 

 and need never encroach on that 

 of the other. The civil arm must 

 leave conscience free ; ecclesiastics 

 may persuade but never coerce the 

 temporal powers. Collision is thus 

 assumed to be impossible, where 

 each side loyally observes the 

 terms of the pact. This was the 

 theory upon which the relations of 

 Papacy and Holy Roman Empire 

 were supposed to depend through- 

 out the Middle Ages. 



Tbe Crucial Problem 



Unhappily, this theory proved 

 impracticable. The history of the 

 Middle Ages is one long, sad record 

 of strife between Pope and Em- 

 peror, Guelph and Ghibelline, 

 Church and State. Philosophers 

 and men of common-sense unite 

 to-day to ridicule the possibility of 

 a hard-and-fast division between 

 two spheres labelled respectively 

 as temporal and spiritual. 



A second theory presented all 

 Christendom as forming one com- 

 monwealth, one spiritual and 

 material whole, over which Rome 

 was supreme, while the various 

 kingdoms of Europe formed its 

 members. In reaction against this 

 doctrine, the Tudor sovereigns of 

 England, particularly Henry VIII 

 and Elizabeth, were the protago- 

 nists of very different views. Papal 

 interference in England was rudely 

 shaken off, and the Church in 

 England became one administra- 

 tive department among many, 

 falling into line with the chancery, 

 the exchequer, and the admiralty. 

 Henry, as head of the state, 

 claimed the right to regulate the 

 religious thoughts and observances 

 of his subjects. 



The fourth theory is the volun- 

 tary principle, in virtue of which 

 many churches may exist under 

 the protection of one state. The 

 civil government, while refusing to 

 set limits to its own absolute 

 sovereignty, disclaims in practice 

 all intention of direct interference 

 in matters of conscience, securing 

 liberty of thought and action to 

 all sects and creeds alike, and 

 treating each religious communion 

 as a voluntary association sub- 

 stantially on the same basis as 

 associations founded for social, 

 economic, or commercial aims. 



What is, perhaps, the most 

 crucial problem of all is that of the 

 most effective method of protecting 

 individual rights and liberties from 

 the tyranny, whether of the one, 

 the many, or the few. In ancient 

 Greece and Rome this problem 

 assumed the form of how best to 

 reconcile a sufficiently powerful 



executive with constitutional lib- 

 erty. In Athens and in Sparta the 

 kingly power proved dangerous 

 and was deliberately weakened by 

 division. This principle was 

 carried further in Rome, as a re- 

 action from the tyrannies of Tar- 

 quinius the Proud. One king, en- 

 joying a monopoly of kingship, 

 gave place to a number of magis- 

 trates known respectively as cen- 

 sors, consuls, praetors, aediles, and 

 tribunes of the plebs. 



In England of the Middle Ages 

 a similar menace was met by a new 

 expedient, destined to be of world- 

 wide beneficence, namely, Parlia- 

 ment and Parliamentary control. 

 The English monarchy which, for 

 a century after the Norman Con- 

 quest, had stood for order as 

 against the barons' wild and law- 

 less anarchy, seemed to change its 

 policy under John. The crown then 

 claimed the widest licence in break- 

 ing its own rules, while the barons 

 seemed to stand for law and order 

 in compelling the grant of Magna 

 Carta : the chief problem of 

 English politics from 1215 for 

 many centuries was how to re- 

 strain the executive government 

 when despotically inclined. The 

 answer may be found in one word, 

 Parliament ; the Great Council of 

 the nation learned how to control 

 the king. In Sir John Seeley's 

 phrase a government-controlling 

 organ was established alongside of 

 a governing organ. This process, 

 begun perhaps in the 13th century, 

 was not completed, even in theory, 

 till the Revolution Settlement of 

 1689, and in practice not till long 

 afterwards. 



Checks upon Parliament 



All the attempted solutions 

 above discussed may be described 

 as varieties of what Montesquieu 

 has made widely known as " The 

 division or separation of powers." 

 Safety for the governed was thus 

 to be found in the multiplication 

 and rivalry of the rulers. But, 

 when the Parliament (or other 

 legislative council) has triumphed 

 over the executive, as is the case in 

 most civilized countries to-day, the 

 problem takes a completely differ- 

 ent shape : How are we to re- 

 strain the despotism of Parlia- 

 ment ? A mere enumeration of 

 attempted answers must here 

 suffice: (1) By splitting Parlia- 

 ment into at least two Houses, 

 both of them effective realities, and 

 placing obstacles in the path of rash 

 and unconsidered legislation. (2) 

 By limiting the scope of the law- 

 making range of Parliament, as 

 was done in regard to Congress by 

 the framers of the American Con- 

 stitution. (3) By some such de- 

 vice as the Referendum, which, in 



Switzerland, confers on the mass 

 of voters the right to veto all 

 measures proposed by the legisla- 

 ture. (4) By means of a Federal 

 system like that of the U.S.A., 

 where the central Congress has to 

 divide the sovereign legislative 

 power not only with the president, 

 but also with a series of local legis- 

 latures, one of which exists in each 

 state of the Union. 



Protecting the Minorities 



The pressing form which this 

 problem takes in democratic lands 

 is that of affording adequate pro- 

 tection to the rights of minorities. 

 A few, but only a few, of the 

 powerful safeguards adopted in the 

 American Commonwealth have 

 been already indicated. The United 

 Kingdom is entirely unprovided 

 with any similar machinery or 

 constitutional expedients. The 

 " checks and balances "that once 

 existed, as described by Walter 

 Bagehot, have now ceased to act. 

 In Great Britain all power has 

 now been accumulated into the 

 hands of the leading members of 

 the Cabinet, who necessarily form 

 also the leaders of the Parliamen- 

 tary majority. Thus minorities, as 

 far as constitutional safeguards 

 go, continue to hold their rights on 

 sufferance, by forbearance of the 

 majority of a House of Commons, 

 the membership of which changes 

 at each successive general election. 

 This danger to individual rights 

 and liberties thus constitutes un- 

 doubtedly for the British Empire 

 the most clamant problem of the 

 present age. 



Bibliography. Histoire de la Sci- 

 ence Politique, P. Janet, 1858 ; 

 Political Science, T. S. Woolsey, 

 1877 ; Lectures on Principles of 

 Political Obligation, T. H. Green, 

 1895 ; Elements of Politics, H. Sidg- 

 wick, 2nd ed. 1897 ; English Poli- 

 tical Philosophy from Hobbes to 

 Maine, W. Graham, 1899 ; Political 

 Theories of the Middle Ages, O. v. 

 Gierke, Eng. trans. F. W. Maitland, 

 1900 ; History of Politics, E. Jenks, 

 1900 ; Legislative Methods and 

 Forms, C. P. Ilbert, 1901 ; A His- 

 tory of Political Theories, Ancient 

 and Medieval, 1902 ; From Luther 

 to Montesquieu, 1905, W. A. Dun- 

 ning ; Introduction to Political Sci- 

 ence, J. R. Seeley, new ed. 1902 ; 

 Elements of Political Science, S. 

 Leacock, 1906 ; Introduction to the 

 History of the Science of Politics, 

 F. Pollock, rev. ed. 1912 ; Political 

 Ideals, C. D. Burns, 1915; Princi- 

 ples of Social Reconstruction, B. A. 

 W. Russell, 1917; Greek Political 

 Theory, E. Barker, 1918. 



Poliziano, OR POLITIAN, ANGELO 

 (1454-1494). Italian poet and 

 scholar. Born in Tuscany, at 

 Monte Pulciano, July 14, 1454, he 

 adopted the Latinised form of the 

 name of his birthplace instead 

 of his patronymic, Ambrogini. 



