ON THE VITALISTIC VIEW OF NATURE. 403 



investigation of the question, Du Bois-Keymond 1 gave 

 the impression, in his earliest deliverance, that the 



1 Du Bois-Reymond's position in | 

 the vitalistic controversy is inter- j 

 eating and instructive, inasmuch ! 

 as he considerably modified his j 

 opinions in course of time. His 

 first deliverance on the subject is | 

 to be found in the preface to his 

 celebrated ' Untersuchungeu iiber ' 

 Thierische Elektricitat ' (March 

 1848). This discussion of the 

 subject followed soon after the 

 deliverances of men like Berzelius 

 (1839), Schwann (1839), Schleiden 

 (1842), Lotze (1842), on the same 

 subject, which are stated to have 

 been "ineffectual." After the 

 lapse of twenty - four years Du 

 Bois - Reymond approached the 

 subject again in his celebrated 

 address at the German Association 

 of Sciences at Leipzig, 1872, en- 

 titled " Ueber die Grenzen des 

 Naturerkennens. " This deliverance 

 created a great sensation : the 

 pamphlet appeared in many 

 editions and translations, and 

 only in this country failed to 

 get adequately noticed. A further 

 explanation of the views ex- 

 pounded in it was given by the 

 author (1880) in an oration at 

 the meeting held annually in 

 honour of Leibniz in the Berlin 

 Academy on the 8th of July. It 

 bears the characteristic title " Die 

 Meben Weltriithsel." These docu- 

 ments together contain the author's 

 "philosophical creed," which ends 

 in " Pyrrhonism," out of which 

 there seems no escape except 

 through " Supernaturalism," which, 

 however, begins where science 

 ends. (See note 1 to the last- 

 mentioned address.) All three 

 documents are reprinted in the 

 two volumes of ' Reden ' (Leipsic, 

 1886-87), from which I quote. In 

 the interval of a quarter of a cen- 

 tury which lay lietween the first and 



second deliverance great changes 

 had come over scientific thought. 

 The mechanical view, which had 

 been put forward in an extreme 

 form in 1848, when it was prophe- 

 sied that " physiology, giving up its 

 particularistic interest, would dis- 

 appear in the great united estate 

 of natural philosophy, would be 

 entirely dissolved in organic 

 physics and chemistry " (vol. ii. p. 

 23), had had time and opportunity 

 to show its power and its limits. 

 It had gained through greater 

 facility of application (such as 

 Ludwig's automatic curve - plot- 

 ting), through the larger con- 

 ception of " Stoffwechsel " as 

 denoting "metabolism " of matter 

 and energy. The author him&elf 

 had introduced a new definition 

 of life as a "dynamical equi- 

 librium " in the place of older 

 descriptions (vol. ii. p. 25) ; and. 

 above all, Darwin had shown the 

 possibility of a mechanical explan- 

 ation of so - called " final causes " 

 in nature. The author himself 

 was one of that great school, 

 emanating from Johannes Mtiller, 

 but now represented by the still 

 greater Helmholtz, which had 

 pushed the mechanical or exact 

 treatment to its furthest limits, 

 to the analysis of the phenomena 

 of the nervous system in its high- 

 est activity, those of sensation 

 and perception. It is therefore 

 highly significant that, instead of 

 confirming the earlier dictum, that 

 the exact treatment would halt 

 only at the most advanced point 

 viz., the manifestation of "free 

 will," the author is now forced to 

 admit that not only is the " origin " 

 of all motion quite obscure, but 

 likewise the lowest forms of 

 animation or consciousness are 

 not to be explained mechanically, 



