206 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



rise, vanish, and chase each other, he conceived the plan of 

 a psychical mechanics, divided into statics and dynamics. 

 To these processes, i.e., the conflict of ideas in the soul, 

 he attempted to apply mathematical calculation through 

 which the resultant intensities of the different ideas 

 could be ascertained. Although the elaborate scheme of 

 Herbart has in the main been abandoned, there is *o 

 doubt that he left upon German Psychology lasting marks 

 of his work in two distinct directions. With an eye for 

 the continual change and movement of ideas within the 

 human soul, he attached much more importance to the 

 tracing of this dynamical process than to a rigorous 

 definition of the faculties of the soul, which was then 

 current and which had been adopted even by Kant. 

 Herbart probably did more than any other contempora- 

 neous thinker to destroy the old faculty-psychology in 

 Germany. 1 And secondly, in looking upon the conscious 



from distinct consciousness, they 

 reproduce each other, they sup- 

 port each other, and so forth. 

 Now, the clear recognition of this 

 distinction between presented and 

 mechanical relation forms a leading 

 feature in Herbart's psychology. 

 He has embodied it in his use of the 

 terms Presentative Activity and 

 Presented Content, and he has 

 made it the basis of his general 

 method in dealing with psychologi- 

 cal problems. He is perpetually 

 inquiring what connection of pres- 

 entative activities corresponds 

 either to a certain connection of 

 presented contents, or to feelings of 

 pleasure and pain, or to desire. 

 Now, if we turn to English writers, 

 we meet with traces, but traces 

 only, of this distinction. Nowhere 

 do we find a thorough and con- 

 sistent application of it, such as 



characterises the Herbartian sys- 

 tem " (Stout in his article on 

 " Herbart compared with English 

 Psychologists," 'Mind,' vol. xiv. 

 p. 2). It is interesting to see that 

 a similar position is taken up by 

 Renouvier in the 1st ed. of the 

 ' Critique GeneVale' (part 1, sec. iii.) : 

 ' ' Ce qui frappe d'abord dans la 

 representation, ce qui en est le car- 

 actere de"terminatif, c'est qu'elle est 

 a double face et ne peut se repre"- 

 senter a elle-meme que bilateYale. 

 Ces deux e"le"rnents que toute rep- 

 resentation suppose, je les signale 

 et ne les de"fmis pas en les nom- 

 inant 1'un rcpresentatif et 1'autre 

 reprisenti. 



1 Herbart seems to have been led 

 to his peculiar view through the 

 influence of Fichte, who conceived 

 of the mind as an original, assertive, 

 and creative agent. Herbart, how- 



