OF THE SOUL. 211 



I am now concerned is affected, it might have appeared 

 natural if the desire to make psychology, or the doctrine 

 of the soul, a definite science, should have led out of 

 metaphysics through observation of facts to that exact 

 treatment which Herbart foreshadowed and which has 

 to some extent though on other lines been realised 

 in our days. Instead of that, the intermediate phase 

 between the metaphysical and the exact treatment was, 

 with the exception of Beneke, left out at the time. 

 With the intention of arriving at the foundation of a 

 reasoned or rational creed, and with the distinct assertion 

 that the idealistic systems had failed to do so, it seemed 

 natural to the German mind to take up those principles 

 which had proved to be of such value in the exact and 

 natural sciences. These had at the time of the collapse 

 of the ruling idealistic philosophy attained to great 

 prominence at some of the German universities ; a new 

 science, that of Physiology, had been founded by German 

 thinkers, and great practical results in medical and 

 industrial practice had already resulted mainly through 

 the efforts of Johannes Miiller and Liebig. To many 

 enthusiastic inquirers and forceful minds nothing seemed 

 simpler than to elevate the supposed elementary notions 

 with which the natural sciences operated and which 17. 

 were in current use, such as matter and force, to the P 



rank of fundamental principles for the mental sciences on ele- 



mentary 



or even to that of articles of a new creed. 1 The errors 



1 It may be well to remark here 

 that to follow the example of the 

 natural sciences had been likewise 

 the aim of the representatives of 

 mental philosophy in this country 



ence being mainly this, that it was 

 the method and practice rather 

 than the principles of the natural 

 sciences which recommended them- 

 selves to British thinkers. This 



at a much earlier date ; the differ- . opened out the large field of ex- 



