OF KNOWLEDGE. 319 



knowledge does not wait till the philosopher has settled 

 the criteria of certainty, nor, on the other hand, is the 

 problem of certainty settled, in the eyes of the logician, 

 by simply pointing to a body of existing and generally 

 accepted knowledge, however extensive this may be. 

 Still, the extension and growth of knowledge, especially 

 of useful knowledge, may be the more attractive side 

 of the problem to certain thinkers in certain times and 

 surroundings, whilst to other thinkers, in other times 

 and placed in a different environment, it may appear 

 more important to arrive at some ultimate ground of 

 certainty than to examine into the methods by which 

 existing knowledge is extended. There is further no 

 doubt that, whether we start with the first or the second 

 of the two questions involved in the problem of know- 

 ledge, we shall in the end have to deal with both. 



From what we have learnt of English philosophy in 

 this chapter, as also on former occasions, it will appear 

 natural that in the beginning of the modern era of 

 thought, the problem of the extension of knowledge 

 should, in this country, have presented itself first, that 

 the question of the nature of knowledge and the grounds 

 of certainty should have come later, that it should have 

 gradually been narrowed down to the search for an ulti- 

 mate foundation of all knowledge quite independent of 

 the particular regions of knowledge which surround us, 

 and that the attempt to establish unity and harmony 

 should have come last. 



But about the time when this characteristic and 

 perfectly logical succession in the different phases of the 

 theory of knowledge was started in this country by 



