OF KNOWLEDGE. 



341 



lie between Locke's and Kant's Treatises, the circle of 

 interests had widened as much through the influence of 

 Locke's speculations themselves in this country, and still 

 more in France, as through that religious and political 

 unrest which, in the sequel, led to the French Kevolu- 

 tion. The difference between political, social, and re- 

 ligious creeds had become more and more accentuated 

 till it became a question, not of different shades of 

 belief but of belief and unbelief, not of different orders 

 of society but of the maintenance or dissolution of any 

 order, of scepticism, of indifferentisin, and subsequently, 

 of anarchy. The problems which presented them- 

 selves to Locke in a limited sphere had gradually 

 assumed the largest dimensions, and required much 

 deeper research and more drastic methods for their 

 solution. 1 As an example, we need only point to the 



1 That Kant's main object in 

 publishing his ' Critical Philosophy ' 

 was to settle the conflict between 

 Knowledge and Faith is clearly 

 brought out by Paulsen in the 

 Introduction to his Work. It is 

 mentioned by Kant himself in the 

 preface to the first edition (1781), 

 but still more emphatically in that 

 to the second edition (1787). 

 Whereas in the earlier preface he 

 treats the subject more from a 

 purely scientific point of view, 

 attacking mainly the dogmatism 

 and indifferentisin of the age, and 

 mentioning only incidentally in 

 the Introduction the higher prob- 

 lems, he very emphatically urges 

 the practical consequences of his 

 doctrine in the later preface. This 

 was no doubt done in order to ex- 

 plain more clearly what he had 

 secretly at heart : to establish be- 

 yond doubt and cavil the sacred- 

 ness of the moral law and the 



religious beliefs which it entails. 

 " A cursory view," he says, " of this 

 Work may suggest that the value 

 of it is purely negative, to induce 

 us in speculation never to venture 

 beyond the limits of experience ; 

 and this is indeed its first merit. 

 . . . But such a criticism ... is 

 indeed of very great and positive 

 value if we consider that there ex- 

 ists a necessary, practical, the moral, 

 use of pure reason, in which it in- 

 evitably extends itself beyond the 

 limits of our sensuous experience " 

 (Pref. to 2nd. ed., Rosenkrauz' ed. 

 of ' Kant's Works,' vol. ii. p. 675). 

 "In this way the teaching of 

 morality maintains its position, as 

 does likewise natural science its 

 own. . . . And just this Discus- 

 sion shows the positive gain of the 

 critical principles of pure reason 

 with regard to the conception of 

 God and of the simple nature of 

 our Soul (p. 678). I had accord- 



