372 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



In the preface Hegel breaks with what he calls the 

 philosophy of reflection, and proposes to bring into con- 

 nection the different elements of thought and the different 

 philosophic positions which, in the critical philosophy 

 and in the systems of Fichte and Schelling, had remained 

 disconnected, as it were improvised at random, forming 

 postulates in the former, and, in the latter, solutions 



dualism which had been created as 

 the result of the Kantian doctrine 

 that no proof existed that the 

 human intellect (the order of 

 thought) was identical with, or an 

 expression of reality (the order of 

 things). To realise this solution 

 Fichte had clothed the Spinozistic 

 conception in that of a moral order 

 or fundamental activity of mind. 

 Schelling, inspired by Goethe, had 

 proclaimed that the union of the 

 ideal and real lies beyond nature 

 and mind, and is exemplified to 

 us in artistic creation ; whereas 

 Schleiermacher, about the same 

 time, maintained that this union 

 existed only in religious feeling. 

 These three thinkers drew their 

 philosophical inspiration equally 

 from Spinoza and Kant, for the 

 latter had exalted the moral law 

 as the supreme reality, had sug- 

 gested the unifying power of intui- 

 tion, and had cleared the way for 

 religious faith. One step more was 

 required, and this was to give a 

 scientific or logical expression, not 

 only to the reasoning of the human 

 mind, but also to the fundamental 

 unity proclaimed in these various 

 forms under the name of the 

 Absolute. The method was to 

 be a scientific process, and the 

 Absolute was to be conceived as 

 a subject or a spirit. This task 

 was what the ' Phenomenology ' pro- 

 fessed to perform. Hegel had pre- 



pared the way in his earlier writ- 

 ings contained in the philosophical 

 journal which he edited together 

 with Schelling. Another point of 

 view from which this work may be 

 considered is that it is an attempt to 

 show how, in the historical develop- 

 ment of thought from the dawn of 

 philosophy in the ancient world, 

 that comprehension or definition 

 of the Absolute was gradually 

 matured which constituted the cen- 

 tral conviction in the philosophical 

 creed of the age ; the timeless sub- 

 stance of Spinoza was to become a 

 living process, the moving spirit 

 in science and art as much as 

 in religion and life. Again, we 

 may see in the ' Phenomenology,' 

 to a large extent, a personal his- 

 tory of Hegel's own mental develop- 

 ment as it has become better known 

 through the labours of Dilthey and 

 others (see supra, p. 250, note). And 

 lastly, we may regard the 'Phe- 

 nomenology ' as a programme, defin- 

 ing the highest intellectual task 

 of subsequent thought, and giving 

 the first sketch of a triumphant 

 solution, to be followed by more 

 detailed exposition. As such a 

 programme, it has lived perhaps 

 unconsciously in many histori- 

 cal and many critical labours 

 since Hegel in Germany. It has 

 been explicitly adopted by a 

 modern school of thinkers in this 

 country. 



