OF KNOWLEDGE. 



375 



termed ErkenntnisstJieorie in Germany, and Epistemology 

 in this country, is for the first time distinctly put forth 

 in that work. It was prepared by the Baconian philo- 

 sophy, the traditions of which, through Locke, Berkeley, 

 and Hume, were inherited by the Scottish school, whose 

 principal exponent in the first quarter of the century was 

 Dugald Stewart. All these thinkers were impressed by 

 the existence and growing volume of a definite kind of 

 knowledge termed natural knowledge. This knowledge 

 existed before an attempt was made to analyse it logic- 

 ally and understand it philosophically as a mental phe- 

 nomenon. A serious attempt to do so was made by a 

 group of thinkers who about the year 1830 marked the 

 new era of mathematical science in England. Most of 



method of scientific reasoning and 

 research had been taken up in- 

 dependently by German natural- 

 ists, among whom Prof. Wundt of 

 Leipzig stands foremost. Wundt 

 approached the problem of know- 

 ledge primarily from the side of the 

 physiology of sense-perception, to 

 which he added an original examina- 

 tion of the " axioms of the physical 

 sciences and their relation to the 

 principle of causality " (1866). 

 Coining twenty - five years after 

 Mill, when the exact and mathe- 

 matical methods of research had, 

 by him and others, been introduced 

 and successfully applied in many 

 fresh fields of natural science, he 

 was able to approach the theory 

 of knowledge with a much greater 

 command of existing material and 

 a better personal acquaintance than 

 Mill possessed. It is interesting to 

 note what Prof. Wundt himself 

 says regarding Mill. " If the his- 

 torian of science in the nineteenth 

 century should wish to name the 

 philosophical works which during 



and shortly after the middle of the 

 century had the greatest influence, 

 he will certainly have to place 

 Mill's ' Logic ' in the first rank. 

 This only slightly original work has 

 hardly had any important influence 

 on the development of philosophy. 

 It was first recommended by Liebig 

 to the German scientific world, 

 which at that time possessed few 

 philosophical interests, and was 

 frequently consulted when philo- 

 sophical questions had perforce to 

 be considered. Thus also the labours 

 in the ' physiology of the senses ' of 

 Helmholtz . . . moved decidedly 

 under the sign of Mill's ' Logic.' " 

 Wundt then goes on to explain 

 that it was not the association- 

 psychology of Mill, but the Logic 

 proper and the theory of the 

 syllogism and of induction, that 

 attracted Helmholtz, independent- 

 ly of their psychological truth or 

 importance. (See W. Wundt in 

 Windelband, ' Die Philosophic im 

 Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahr- 

 hunderts,' vol. i. p. 28, &c.) 



