OF REALITY. 437 



ing. One of these terms was " the Thing in itself," 

 another was " the Categorical Imperative." These two 

 terms fix, as it were, Kant's position with regard to 

 the two main problems of reality, his answers to the 

 two questions, What is Real? and What is the truly 

 Eeal? 



To begin with the first, with " the Thing in itself." 10. 

 When Kant analysed our knowledge of things which m itself." 

 we call real, he not only, with Locke, discarded as 

 apparent and purely subjective the secondary qualities, 

 dependent upon the nature of our senses, but he also 

 discarded the primary qualities, the space which things 

 occupy and the time during which events happen, as 

 arising out of the form of our perceiving intellect. 

 Depriving thus what seemed to be external realities, 

 the phenomena of nature, both of their secondary and 

 their primary qualities, treated as mere appearance, there 

 remained over only an indefinable something by which 

 real things were distinguished from purely subjective 

 images. This something we can, according to Kant, 

 only conceive by thought, we cannot perceive it. It 

 was a Noumenon in distinction from the Phenomenon ; 

 the former he termed " the Thing in itself," or " Things 

 in themselves," in opposition to the Thing or Things as 

 they appear. 1 This is equivalent to saying that ex- 



1 A concise and lucid history of j to already. Jacobi's pertinent re- 



the influence of the conception of j marks, made so early as 1787 



the 'Thing in itself and its cog- ' (' Werke,' vol. ii. p. 304), "that 



nate but not synonymous designa- j without this assumption he was un- 



tions as the Noumenon, the trans- ] able to enter the system, and with 



cendental object or the x of the it unable to remain inside of it," 



Kantian philosophy, is to be found j indicates the difficulty of thinking 



in Windelband's ' History of Phil- of something of which we know 



osophy ' ( 41) frequently referred nothing. Accordingly the Kantian 



