OF REALITY. 



465 



translate the title of this book as the Phenomenology of 

 Spirit, for by this word (in German Gfeist) the philosophy 

 of Hegel is most clearly distinguished from that of 

 Schelling. Both philosophies profess to be, as was that 

 of Spinoza, philosophies of the Absolute. With Spinoza 

 the Absolute was conceived as substance, with Schelling 

 it meant at that time the identity or indifference of 

 matter and mind, of the inner world and the outer, the 

 hidden ground, source, or unity of both. From that 

 point where he conceived the Absolute as the deeper 

 lying unity or identity, Schelling went on in search 

 of other fuller and more adequate expressions, at the 

 moment when Hegel, after many years of preparatory 

 work, conceived the essence of the Absolute to be Spirit. 



Preface to Hegel's ' Phenomen- 

 ology ' in the year 1807. The last 

 letter which he addressed to Hegel, 

 six months after receiving the great 

 work of the latter, is accompanied 

 by a copy of his own celebrated 

 Address before the Munich Academy 

 which created such a sensation. 

 The contrast between Schelling's 

 and Hegel's minds, as well as that 

 between their work, is indeed 

 significantly expressed by these 

 two characteristic products of the 

 genius of each. On the one 

 side, a ponderous volume, full 

 of enigmas, which has ever since 

 its appearance furnished material 

 for philosophical thought and on 

 which the last word has not yet 

 been spoken. On the other side, 

 a finished oration, one of Schelling's 

 best productions, admired by many, 

 full of artistic and poetical life and 

 suggestion, comparable to some of 

 Goethe's best writings in German 

 or Ruskin's in English. And at the 

 same time we have Schelling's own 

 expression of the deep-lying differ- 

 ence which separated him after- 



VOL. III. 



wards and increasingly from Hegel. 

 "Our real difference of conviction 

 or opinion an irreconcilable dif- 

 ference can be shortly and 

 clearly found and decided : for 

 indeed everything might be recon- 

 ciled, one thing excepted. Thus, 

 I must confess, that I can so 

 far not understand your meaning 

 when you oppose the notion [Be- 

 griff] to the intuition [Anschauung, 

 i.e., ' seeing ']. You cannot possibly 

 under the former term mean any- 

 thing else but what you and I have 

 called the Idea, the nature of which 

 is to have one side from which it is 

 ' notion ' and one from which it is 

 'intuition'" (Ibid., vol. ii. p. 

 124). Expressed in terms which 

 I have used several times already, 

 we may say that Hegel represents 

 the analytical method to be com- 

 pleted by a subsequent synthesis ; 

 Schelling on his part started from, 

 and remained permanently in, the 

 region of synopsis, of seeing things 

 in their Together. (See supra, p. 

 192 note.) 



2 G 



