534 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT, 



eo. with the development of German thought, and with the 



Bradley 



andLotze. latest phase which it reached in the critical eclecticism 

 of Lotze, will not fail to compare Mr Bradley's enterprise 

 with Lotze's ' Metaphysik,' which appeared in 1841. 

 Both works may be looked upon as attempts to give a 

 consistent meaning to the current philosophical termin- 

 ology, most of which has come down to us from an- 

 tiquity. Both works start, explicitly or implicitly, from 

 the assumption that the several abstract terms employed 

 in dealing with the problems of Knowledge, Truth, and 

 Keality, are meant to convey a consistent and deeper 

 sense which it is necessary to unfold and lay bare before 

 we can start upon the discussion of any special problem. 

 Formally, this undertaking amounts therefore merely to a 

 distinct logical definition of the words employed in philo- 

 sophical language; substantially, it means that we abstract 

 out of the casual, fluctuating, and many-sided use of the 

 standard philosophical terms a consistent system of ideas 

 affording the nearest approach to an expression of Truth 

 and Eeality which the human mind is capable of. 



But though the object pursued by Mr Bradley in his 

 matured analysis presents much similarity with the 

 youthful undertaking of Lotze, the central position 

 which he arrives at differs markedly from that of Lotze. 

 I have above given extracts from Lotze's work which 

 indicate very clearly the character of his philosophy. 

 I will now select a passage from Mr Bradley's work 

 which similarly places us at the centre of his specula- 

 tion. In the earlier part of his work he arrives at the 

 result that the " Absolute " 1 what I have throughout 



1 See 'Appearance and Reality,' p. 144. 



