OF NATURE. 



563 



(1843) and "The Soul" (1846), as well as in his three 

 works on Pathology and Physiology (1842, 1851, 1852). 

 Ignorant or oblivious of the fact that these writings of 

 Lotze contained only one side of his philosophical creed, 

 Carl Vogt utilised some of the arguments contained 

 therein to attack the somewhat dubious position which 

 the celebrated physiologist Kudolph Wagner had taken 

 up to the questions of the Soul, spiritual existence, and 

 religious faith, a view which Lotze himself did not 

 share or support. It was easy to show how, by an 

 application of the purely mechanical conceptions of 

 Matter and Force, great progress had been made in 

 the description and explanation of phenomena and 

 processes within the living organism, and how the 

 psychological or metaphysical conceptions of Mind, Soul, 

 Life, and Consciousness contributed nothing towards an 

 exact definition and understanding of these phenomena. 

 It was not clearly recognised at the time, except 



Pathology, and if Lotze himself had 

 not adopted a peculiar metaphysic 

 of his own, of which it is difficult 

 to understand how it could main- 

 tain itself by the side of his own 

 critical acumen " (English Trans- 

 lation by Thomas, 1880, vol. ii. 

 p. 285). Lange then proceeds to 

 show how Czolbe was stimulated 

 through Lotze's critical destruction 

 of the supersensible notion of vital 

 force to make the destruction of 

 the Supersensible as such the prin- 

 ciple of a comprehensive philosophic 

 creed. In this endeavour Lange 

 shows, as had already been shown 

 by Lotze himself in his review 

 of Czolbe's principal work (1855, 

 reprinted in ' Kleiue Schriften,' 

 vol. iii. p. 238), how materialism 

 and sensationalism are apt to be 

 insufficiently distinguished. " If 



we wish to distinguish strictly 

 between Sensationalism and Ma- 

 terialism, we must give the for- 

 mer name only to those systems 

 which hold to the origin of our 

 knowledge from the senses, and 

 attach no importance to the power 

 of constructing the universe from 

 atoms, molecules, or other modifi- 

 cations of matter. The Sensa- 

 tionalist may assume that matter 

 is mere representation, because 

 what we have immediately in 

 perception is only sensation and 

 not ' matter. ' But he may also, 

 like Locke, be inclined to refer 

 spirit to matter. So soon, how- 

 ever, as this becomes the essential 

 basis of the whole system, we have 

 before us genuine Materialism " 

 (p. 286). 



