OF THE GOOD. 159 



Hellenic ideal, the unity of the Beautiful and the Good, 

 the harmonious fusion of the sensuous and spiritual 

 elements of human personality, could not rest satisfied 

 with the rigid contrast in which Kant had placed the 

 moral sense of obligation to the natural inclinations of 

 the human soul. Schiller arrived at the artistic con- 

 ception of the Beautiful Soul. The beautiful soul, or the 

 beautiful disposition, is characterised by the union of 

 duty and desire, and there exists a moral grace which is 

 the expression of the beautiful soul. This conception 

 is characteristic of Schiller's combined ethical and 

 sesthetical speculation. 



Schiller's opposition to Kant's rigorism came out still 

 more clearly when he read the last-mentioned treatise of 

 Kant, that on ' Eeligion within the limits of Mere Eeason.' 

 He was deeply moved by it, but also repelled ; he could not 

 agree with Kant's conception of evil and sin. His whole 

 nature revolted against Kant's theory of a radical base 

 element contained in human nature. Although he de- 

 clared himself incapable of refuting Kant's arguments, 

 he could not reconcile Kant's doctrine of the Autonomy 

 of the Good Will with this radical leaning towards evil. 

 Should the latter really exist, then it seemed to him that 

 the Autonomy, the self-restrained Freedom of the Will, 

 would have to be given up, but with the freedom one 

 would also have to sacrifice the possibility of its pheno- 

 menal appearance, the possibility of beauty and grace 

 combined, the conception of the beautiful soul. He 

 accompanied Kant a long way in his ethical expositions, 

 he agreed thoroughly with him in expelling from Ethics 

 everything connected with utility, happiness, or inclina- 



