206 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



successors, to give to morality a metaphysical founda- 

 tion, to absorb ethics in metaphysics, or to neglect it 

 altogether, which, as it seemed to him, meant to mis- 

 understand fundamentally the ethical problem. 



Herbart did not do much to elaborate this fruitful 

 and, to a considerable extent, novel aspect. It was 

 elaborated by a thinker who for some time was counted 

 among the disciples of Herbart, but who distinctly 

 repudiated this honour, though much of his thought 

 recalls the influence both of Herbart and Leibniz. 

 47. This thinker was Hermann Lotze, in whose system the 



Lotze's 



doctrine conception of value or worth assumed a commanding 



of values. 



position and received a definite expression. To this 

 I have had occasion to refer already in the last chapter, 

 in dealing with the problem of the Beautiful. 1 Lotze 

 did not confine himself, as Herbart did, to a registration 

 of our sesthetical or ethical judgments of value, he 

 gave to the conception of value a place in his 

 metaphysical system, differing in this fundamentally 

 from Herbart ; he maintained that by the human mind 

 the actual world is comprehended by contemplating 

 it from three logically independent aspects, which in 

 experience and practice are intricately interwoven : the 

 world of facts or things, the world of laws or relations, 

 and the world of values or worths. Although subsequent 

 speculation has not, either in Germany or in this country, 

 adopted verbatim this formula of Lotze's, there is no 

 doubt that, as in many other respects, modern thought 

 in both countries is knowingly or unknowingly indebted 

 to Lotze for a special expression and revival of the 



1 See supra, p. 64 sqq. 



