OF THE SPIRIT. 



297 



Philosophy of Spinoza,' and his 'Criticism of David 

 Hume/ as well as in his subsequent writings and 

 correspondence, he strongly urged the fact that belief 

 lies at the bottom of all our knowledge. He attacks 

 especially the doctrine of the " thing in itself," the 

 unknown X of Kant's philosophy. He maintained 

 that, according to Kant, the human intellect hovers or 

 oscillates indefinitely in a region between the unknown 

 reality of an external world and the equally unknown 

 essence of an inner world, in the empty cloud-land of 

 time and space ; that sensation has nothing behind it 

 and the understanding nothing in front of it, and that, 

 in consequence, the whole process must end inevitably in 

 pure scepticism. This transcendental ignorance Jacobi 

 confronts with his ' Realism of Belief.' All truth con- 

 sists in the knowledge of reality, such knowledge is im- 

 mediate and not mediated, a matter of feeling. Compared 



we may term the religious teach- 

 ing was, in these earlier works, 

 metaphysical on the one side and 

 ethical on the other. In the 

 Third Critique a reconciliation 

 of this twofold aspect was at- 

 tempted, and the way indicated 

 for the speculations of his succes- 

 sors. Late in life Kant wrote a 

 special Treatise ('Religion within 

 the limits of mere Reason,' 1793), 

 and several smaller Tracts, the 

 latest being on the ' Conflict of the 

 Faculties' (1798), the main purport 

 of which was a philosophical in- 

 terpretation or paraphrase of the 

 existing religious doctrine of the 

 Christian Churches. The outcome 

 of this is concisely given by Paulsen 

 (loc. cit.,p. 393) as follows: "Put 

 into formulae, the religious teach- 

 ing of Kant can be laid down in 



the following points : 1. The 

 essence of religion is not the 

 belief in supernatural beings which 

 eventually affect nature and human 

 life, but a belief in God, an all-per- 

 vading Will for the Good, which 

 realises itself in nature and history. 

 2. The proof of religion does not 

 consist in historical facts (miracles, 

 revelation), but in the moral law 

 or the good will in us, aiming at 

 the highest Good. 3. The object 

 of religion is not the subjection of 

 the will or the understanding under 

 any powers, Here or Beyond, but 

 solely the strengthening in us of 

 the will for the Good." Paulsen 

 concludes by saying "that these 

 formulas may even now be made 

 the foundation of religious phil- 

 osophy." 



