322 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



Eitschl has urged this view as the only one which 

 secures a firm foundation for a science of theology, for 

 a systematic exposition of Christian doctrine and a 

 practical realisation of Christian ideals, he has im- 

 parted quite a new life to German theology ; l but he 



1 It must be clearly understood 

 that what is said in the text about 

 Ritschl, as well as about Schleier- 

 macher, does not attempt or imply 

 any critical opinion as to the value 

 of their theological systems. We 

 have here again the analogy of 

 natural science to make the posi- 

 tion clearer. If, e.g. , dynamics, 

 physics, chemistry, &c,, start with 

 certain principles such as the prin- 

 ciple of inertia, or the principle of 

 least action, or the law of gravita- 

 tion, or the atomic theory, or the 

 principle of energy, it becomes a 

 philosophical problem to state and 

 to define these principles as they 

 are used in the course of scientific 

 research and explanation. But it 

 is not the object of philosophy to 

 follow this application into its de- 

 tails, or even to decide to what 

 extent and within what limits 

 eacli of these principles is useful 

 in affording an explanation, a co- 

 herent picture of the existing things 

 of nature which surround us ; this 

 is entirely a matter for the scientific 

 enquirer, and must always be based 

 on, and verified by, observation 

 and experiment. In a similar way, 

 the positions of philosophical theo- 

 logians like Schleiermacher and 

 Ritschl are subject to philosoph- 

 ical enquiry, to definition and dis- 

 cussion ; but the modes in which, 

 on these fundamental positions, the 

 structure of theological science, or 

 even of religious belief, is raised, 

 are entirely different problems, and 

 must depend upon religious experi- 

 ence and historical study. And 

 these, and not philosophical the- 



ories, must decide as to their value 

 and correctness. From the latter 

 point of view there have appeared 

 in this country two essays on 

 Ritschl's theology, in answer to the 

 competition for the Norrisian 

 Prize (1908), both of which I 

 recommend to English readers as 

 a good introduction to the difficult 

 study of what has been termed 

 Ritschlianism. They are by E. A. 

 Edghill ('Faith and Hope,' 1910) and 

 by J. K. Mozley ('Ritschlianisui,' 

 1909). The very fact that the word 

 Ritschliauism has been coined, and 

 that it is said to represent an atti- 

 tude of theological reasoning which 

 is widespread and not the exclusive 

 characteristic of Ritschl's theology, 

 shows that it forms an important 

 chapter in a general history of 

 thought during the second half of 

 the nineteenth century. The prin- 

 cipal works of Ritschl, in which the 

 points that are of philosophical inter- 

 est must be studied, comprise first 

 his great work on ' Justification and 

 Reconciliation' (3 vols., 1870-1875). 

 It underwent a thorough revision 

 by Ritschl himself in two following 

 editions, in which many of the 

 fundamental positions are further 

 modified and developed. Next to 

 this his tract on ' Theology and 

 Metaphysics' (1881) is of special 

 interest as showing the marked 

 influence of Lotze's philosophy 

 in addition to that of Kant and 

 Schleiermacher. But, as stated al- 

 ready, Ritschl's philosophical foun- 

 dations underwent a marked change 

 as he wrote and worked during the 

 transition period of German phil- 



