OF THE SPIRIT. 



For those who refuse to deduce the feeling of duty 

 and obligation either psychologically or historically 

 from non - moral elements, and consider it, with Kant, 

 to be the starting-point, centre, and foundation of 

 any and every higher or spiritual view of things, 

 there will always exist the furthe'r task of interpreting 

 this unique and remarkable experience through some 

 reasoned creed, as well as of showing its purport and 

 working throughout the whole region of practical life. 

 The fundamental assertion or postulate will have to be 

 followed by a more or less elaborate ontology (theory 

 of being) and a system of morality (theory of conduct). 

 Long before philosophers had professedly done so, the 

 common-sense of mankind had attempted this inter- 

 pretation and expansion of the moral postulate in the 

 various historical religions and moralities of the different 

 nations and ages of the world. 



It is with a true insight into the connection of ideas 

 that Guyau and others have pointed out that if the 

 spirit of toleration makes it desirable that religious 



of it in this connection is similar 

 to that of the word " force " by 

 materialists, such as Biichner in 

 his well - known work. In his 

 philosophy the word " force " would 

 be of no use if it was reduced to 

 its purely mechanical meaning as 

 a measure of motion, and similarly 

 the word "right" has several 

 meanings. It may mean that 

 which is logically correct ; as such 

 it refers merely to a formal process, 

 and has nothing to do with reality. 

 It may mean the opposite of wrong, 

 and if used in this sense imports a 

 moral distinction ; or it may mean, 

 what the author probably intends, 



that which is reasonable. The 

 German language makes a dis- 

 tinction between recht and richtig. 

 In the Hegelian system, and among 

 writers influenced by it, the identi- 

 fication of what is morally right 

 with what is reasonable has been 

 much discussed. With Hegel the 

 identification of the two terms is 

 based upon the conception of 

 reason, not as a merely formal 

 logical process, but as an inherent 

 principle of reality. For such a 

 conception the scientific aspect, if 

 reduced to the mechanical, has, 



