OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 689 



his philosophy of history. He expressly remarks that 

 when elaborating his own scheme he purposely abstained 

 from reading other philosophies of history such as those 

 of Vico, Kant, Herder, and Hegel. Unlike von 

 Hartmann, who spent the latter part of his life in 

 studying and explaining the relation in which his own 

 philosophy stood to other systems, Comte does not seem 

 to have carefully studied any other philosophy. His his- 

 torical sense did not prompt him to exhibit in detail his 

 own speculation as the latest result of other and earlier 

 courses of thought. In this way he is different from 

 Schopenhauer, who distinctly attaches the fundamental 

 conception in his speculations to the history of 

 a definite philosophical problem which was brought 

 out, but not solved, by Kant. Comte anticipates a 

 complete reorganisation of thought and society as a 

 result of his doctrine. In this respect he resembles 

 both Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, especially the 

 latter, who, however, differs from him inasmuch as he 

 does not look for any sudden effect and acceptance of 

 his teaching : whereas Comte, during the later years of 

 his life, lived in this respect under a great illusion. 



The philosophy of Comte leads us by an easy step to eo. 



rlcrocrt 



that of Herbert Spencer. The two thinkers are in spencer. 

 popular literature frequently classed together : Spencer 

 is sometimes considered to be a Positivist, and Comte an 

 Evolutionist. Spencer himself objects to being placed 

 in the same category with Comte, and Comte, though 

 making free use of the term " evolution," did not really 

 enter into the spirit of the doctrine in its modern form. 

 The two doctrines however can be, to a large extent, 

 VOL. iv. 2 x 



