704 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



nition that Darwin's theory of natural selection could 

 be fitted into the Spencerian scheme in which, together 

 with Lamarckian adaptation, it formed such an important 

 illustration of organic change. And at least in one large 

 department, in that of biology, Darwinism supplied exactly 

 that principle which Spencer's scheme was essentially in 

 need of; it supplied, or was at least very largely credited 

 with supplying, a principle of progress. Through it the 

 term Evolution acquired the meaning of an advance 

 from the lower to the higher, and partook of that 

 peculiarity so characteristic of Hegel's principle, that 

 it set no definable limit to the process of mental 

 development. 



But it soon became evident that the Spencerian 

 scheme of evolution is incomplete. This incompleteness, 

 though obvious from the beginning to a few penetrating 

 critics, escaped general notice through the enormous 

 array of actual facts marshalled before the minds 

 of Spencer's readers. The want of transition from the 

 general principles to their application in separate regions 

 of knowledge, the fact that in each of these regions this 

 application had to begin with the introduction of special 

 factors or data which were, between the different regions, 

 connected merely by vague analogies, was a defect which 

 was early recognised. Beyond the reference to the 

 nebular hypothesis of Laplace in cosmical physics and to 

 the transformist view in geology introduced by Lyell, we 

 find in Spencer's writings no attempt to deal with evolu- 

 tion in inorganic nature. This omission, though explained 

 by Spencer as inevitable considering the magnitude of 

 the task he set himself, is nevertheless unfortunate, for 



