742 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



general acceptance of the higher metaphysical principles, 

 but a reversion to psychological, historical, and anthro- 

 pological studies. In this direction the second half of 

 the nineteenth century accumulated an enormous mass 

 of material which foremost thinkers of the present day 

 aim at utilising for the purpose of working out the 

 programme of earlier Idealism. It is now being grad- 

 ually admitted that no one indicated this programme 

 more clearly and comprehensively than Hegel himself. 

 That he failed to impress lastingly the philosophical 

 mind may be traced, among other causes, to two main 

 defects in the process by which he tried to carry out 

 his main principle and to substantiate the inherent 

 truth of his fundamental conception. This fundamental 

 conception is that of the ultimate Eeality as Mind or 

 Spirit. 

 10. As I have pointed out on former occasions, the German 



Ambiguity 



of Hegel's word Geist has several meanings. The very attempt to 

 translate it into the English language reveals the un- 

 certainty of the conception, the context of Hegel's 

 own exposition requiring us sometimes to use the word 

 Mind, sometimes Spirit, sometimes Consciousness. Had 

 Hegel entered upon a more careful psychological account 

 of what is meant by this term he would have been 

 able to guard his followers from putting too narrow a 

 definition upon his fundamental principle ; had he, e.g., 

 continually kept before his readers his earlier expression 

 that the Absolute is Subject, no doubt could have arisen 

 as to his position regarding the question of the Person- 

 ality of the Absolute or the Divine Spirit, and his phil- 



