VENEZUELA AND AFTER 331 



source of exasperation to American feelings, 

 but were also a grave obstacle to the construc 

 tion of a canal. A strong sentiment prevailed 

 that no canal at all was preferable to one over 

 which Great Britain should have joint control. 

 Especially in view of the recent extension given 

 to the Monroe Doctrine, the intrusion of a 

 European power in the affairs of the isthmus 

 was resented as intolerable. 



Under the circumstances, the willingness of 

 Great Britain to abandon her rights under the 

 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was a very great step 

 in the promotion of good feeling. Yet the mode 

 of abandonment was subjected to diligent, not 

 to say suspicious, scrutiny by the American 

 Senate. Secretary Hay and Sir Julian Paunce- 

 fote concluded a treaty in February, 1900, that 

 the Senate refused to approve except with 

 amendments. In this draft Great Britain re 

 nounced all right to participate in the construc 

 tion, ownership, or maintenance of a canal, but 

 assumed jointly with the United States, and 

 such other powers as should be willing, respon 

 sibility for the neutrality of the work. Even 

 tually the American extremists had their way, 

 and the United States was left in sole control 

 of neutralization as well as of construction 



