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tcrtained the same opinion. Each member estimated differently 

 the importance of that right according to his own information and 

 impressions. Some believed it to be of more importance some 

 of less importance, and some of about the same importance, as the 

 fishing privilege, but not one, excepting Mr. Adams, considered it 

 a mere phantom, worth absolutely nothing. Mr. Gallatin appears 

 to have thought it equal, at least, to the fishing privilege. In his 

 separate letter, already mentioned, (c) he says &quot; if the right&quot; (the 

 fishing privilege) &quot; must be considered as abrogated by the war, 

 we cannot regain it without an equivalent. We had none to offer 

 but the recognition of their right to navigate the Mississippi, and 

 we offered it. On this last supposition,&quot; (the abrogation of the 

 treaty of 1783, by war) &quot; this right is also lost to them, and in a 

 general point of view we have certainly lost nothing.&quot; The neces 

 sary construction of this clause is, that, by abrogating the Missis 

 sippi right, we gained as much as we lost by abrogating the fishing 

 privilege and thus, in a general point of view we have lost nothing 

 by abrogating both; thus making the two of equal value. 



I certainly differed very much from Mr. Adams in his estimate 

 of this right under his doctrine, united with his construction, or 

 under his proposal. I did not appreciate it by the mere beneficial 

 or legitimate uses that might be made of it. Its importance I con 

 sidered to be derived from its evils from the abuse of it, and from 

 the pernicious facility which it would afford to British smugglers 

 and British emissaries to defraud the revenue and to excite the 

 Indians. If our instructions, of the 15th of April, 1813, had been 

 no longer imperative, they furnished, at least, evidence in point, 

 which was entitled to attention. The privilege of British traders 

 from Canada, and the Northwest Company, were not to be renewed, 

 because &quot; the pernicious effects of this privilege had been most sensi 

 bly felt in the present war, by the influence which it gave over our 

 Indians, whose whole force has been wielded by means thereof against 

 the inhabitants of our western States and Territories. 



We ourselves had borne testimony, during the negotiation, to 

 the magnitude of the evil resulting from allowing to British traders 

 and agents access to our Indians. In our note to the British minis 

 ters of the 21st of September, 1814, we say, &quot; The undersigned 

 very sincerely regret to be obliged to say that an irresistible mas* 

 of evidence, consisting principally of the correspondence of British 

 officers and agents, part only of which has already been published 

 in America, establishes, beyond all rational doubt, the fact that a 

 constant system of excitement to these hostilities was pursued by 

 British Traders and Agents, who had access to our Indians, not only 

 without being discountenanced, but with frequent encouragement 

 by the British authorities. And if they had ever dissuaded the 

 Indians from commencing hostilities, it was only by advising them, 

 as in prudence, to suspend their attacks until Great Britain could 

 recognise them in the war.&quot; 



Here was surely evidence to prove the danger of giving to Brr- 



