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will duly consider the situation and circumstances of this nation aoJ 

 its government, in October, 1814, will, I believe, not be very ready 

 to join in a censure upon the government for offering a peace on the 

 basis of the state before the war. There was then a heavy re 

 sponsibility, both upon the government and upon the mission at 

 Ghent, that the war should be concluded. This nation would have 

 ill-brooked a rupture of the negotiation upon light or trivial causes, 

 and if it had been broken off upon a refusal to continue to the Bri 

 tish a mere nominal nght to navigate the Mississippi, possessed by 

 them and harmless to us until the war had begun, the government 

 and the mission would nave had a very different task. to justify 

 themselves to this country, from that which they now have. If, 

 instead of writing his letter of 1 1th February, 1815, from Paris. 

 Mr. Russell had brought the substance of it home in his pocket, 

 with the war still raging, and he had said, We have not concluded 

 the peace we have broken off the negotiation but here are our 

 reasons producing his letter of seven sheets against the Mississip 

 pi navigation, and the fisheries What would the nation and the 

 world have said of the American government and the American 

 mission at Ghent ? After the responsibility has been removed, 

 and the peace concluded, it is very easy to &quot; enjoy the good and 

 cavil the conditions&quot; but in this case, measure still harder is dealt, 

 out to the government and the majority of the mission : after the 

 good is secured, the cavil is against conditions not annexed to it, 

 but merely once proposed not against an actual stipulation, but 

 against a rejected offer against a possibility extinct. 



It is sufficient for the justification of the majority of the mission 

 that it was authorized, and that they believed it to be required by 

 their instructions. But I cannot pass over this censure upon the 

 government for issuing the instructions themselves, without notice. 

 Far from deeming them blameable, I believe them to have been 

 wise and meritorious. The instructions not to surrender the fish 

 eries, even at the hazard of breaking off the negotiation, mani 

 fested a sensibility congenial to the true and essential interests of 

 the country. I have in these papers furnished proof that the in 

 terest in the fisheries at stake in the negotiation, was great and im 

 portant. The disquisitions in the Western newspapers on this 

 subject, dwell largely upon the state of politics then prevailing in 

 the Eastern section of the Union. This is an invidious topic, and I 

 wish to dismiss it, with this observation, that the administration of 

 Mr. Madison could not have honoured itself more than by maintain 

 ing with inflexible energy against the enemy, the special interest of 

 that portion of the Union which had been most opposed to the war. 

 But had that illustrious statesman and patriot suffered himself on 

 that occasion to be influenced by narrower considerations, it could 

 not escape him, that however exceptionable the political course of 

 the State of Massachusetts might be, the portion of the people, most 

 particularly interested in these fisheries, neither countenanced nor 

 supported it. They had been the first, and were among the great- 



