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been enjoyed under the treaty of 1783 : it has narrowed down the 

 pretensions of exclusive territorial jurisdiction with reference to 

 these fisheries, to three marine miles from the shores. Upon the 

 whole, I consider this interest as secured by the convention of 

 1818, in a manner as advantageous as it had been by the treaty of 

 1783 ; we have gained by it, even of fishing liberties, perhaps as 

 much as we have lost ; but if not, we have gained practically the 

 benefit of the principle, that our liberties in the fisheries recognised 

 by the treaty of 1783, were not abrogated by the war of 1812. If 

 they had been, we never should have obtained, without a new war, 

 any portion of them again. The error of the editorial article ia 

 the Argus, is in putting out of sight the difference between a con 

 tested and an uncontested right. After the conclusion of the peace 

 of Ghent, according to the American side of the argument, and by 

 virtue of the principle, assumed at the proposal of Mr. Clay, the 

 rights and liberties of the people of the United States in these 

 fisheries, remained in full force, as they had been recognised by 

 the treaty of 1783. According to the British side of the argument, 

 and to the doctrine of Mr. Russell s Letter from Paris, they were 

 totally abrogated by the war. The letter says, in express terms, 

 that the liberty was &quot; entirely at an end ;&quot; and, that we were left 

 * without any title to it whatsoever.&quot; If this was the real doctrine of 

 the minority of the American mission at Ghent, has not the Secre 

 tary reason to exult, and to give many thanks to God, that instead 

 of avowing it, they professed directly the contrary ? That Mr. 

 Clay himself proposed to the mission, and the mission at his pro 

 posal adopted the opposite principle, the American side of the ar 

 gument. After the peace of Ghent, the right of the people of the 

 United States to the fishing liberties was perfect, but it was contest 

 ed. There was a British side of the argument, and what we have 

 gained by the convention of 1818, has been an adjustment of that 

 contest, preserving essentially the whole interest that was in dis 

 pute. The first article of the convention is upon its face the ad 

 justment of a contested question. The documents of the negotia 

 tion prove how it was adjusted, and show that we obtained the ad 

 justment by maintaining our principle. On the principle of the let 

 ter from Paris, there was no liberty to maintain, no right to assert., 

 no contest to adjust : the liberty was gone, irretrievably lost. 



The editorial article says, that &quot; if the British were to claim the 

 right to navigate the Mississippi to-morrow, the Secretary would 

 be obliged to grant their claim valid or contradict his own favourite 

 principle ! !&quot; The double notes of admiration annexed to this 

 closing period of the editorial article, indicate a long cherished and 

 intense desire to fasten upon the Secretary, in spite of all that he 

 can say, the deep crimination of the dreadful consequences to 

 which his, favourite principle might yet lead. Mr. Russell, too, has 

 resorted to this forlorn hope of charge against the Secretary. My 

 reply to it is this 



