150 MAXIMS OF THE LAW. 



and suffer a recovery to the conusee, and in both fine and 

 recovery there is error ; this fine is Janus bifrons, and will 

 look forwards, and bar him of his writ of error brought of 

 the recovery ; and therefore it will come to the reason of 

 the first case of the attainder, that he must reply, that he 

 hath a writ also depending of the same fine, and so demand 

 judgment. 



16 E. 3. To return to our first purpose, like law is it if tenant in 



Fitz. age, 45. ^-j Q f two acres ma k e two several discontinuances to several 

 persons for life rendering a rent, and bringeth & formedon 

 of both, and in formedon brought of white acre the reversion 

 and rent reserved upon black acre is pleaded, and so con 

 trary: I take it to be a good replication, that he hath 

 formedon also upon that depending, whereunto the tenant 

 hath pleaded the descent of the reversion of white acre; 

 and so neither shall be a bar: and yet there is no doubt 

 but if in a formedon the warranty of tenant in tail with assets 

 be pleaded, it is no replication for the issue to say, that a 

 pracipe dependeth brought by I. S. to evict the assets. 



But the former case standeth upon the particular reason 

 before mentioned. 



REGULA III. 



Verbafortius accipiuntur contra proferentem. 

 THIS rule, that a man s deeds and his words shall be taken 

 strongliest against himself, though it be one of the most com 

 mon grounds of the law, it is notwithstanding a rule drawn 

 out of the depth of reason ; for, first, it is a schoolmaster 

 of wisdom and diligence in making men watchful in their 

 own business ; next, it is author of much quiet and cer 

 tainty, and that in two sorts ; first, because it favoureth 

 acts and conveyances executed, taking them still benefi 

 cially for the grantees and possessors : and secondly, be 

 cause it makes an end of many questions and doubts about 

 construction of words; for if the labour were only to pick 

 out the intention of the parties, every judge would have a 

 several sense ; whereas this rule doth give them a sway to 

 take the law more certainly one way. 



But this rule, as all other which are very general, is 

 but a sound in the air, and cometh in sometimes to help 

 and make up other reasons without any great instruction 

 or direction ; except it be duly conceived in point of differ 

 ence, where it taketh place, and where not. And first we 

 will examine it in grants, and then in pleadings. 



The force of this rule is in three things, in ambiguity of 



