THE CASE OF REVOCATION OF USES. 287 



And so in our case immediately after the declaration is in 

 tended when all things shall be performed, that are coupled 

 with the said declaration. 



But in this I doubt I labour too much ; for no man will 

 be of opinion, that it was intended that the Lady Stanhope 

 should be six whole months without either the old jointure 

 or the new ; but that the old should expect until the new 

 were settled without any interim. And so I conclude this 

 course of atonements, as Fitzwilliams s case calls it, 

 whereby I have proved, that all the words, by a true mar 

 shaling of the acts, may stand according to the intent of 

 the parties. 



I may add tanquam ex abundantly that if both clauses do 

 not live together, they must both die together ; for the law 

 loves neither fractions of estates nor fractions of construc 

 tions ; and therefore in Jermin and Askew s case, 37 Eliz. Jermin and As- 

 a man did devise lands in tail with proviso, that if the de- kew s case - 

 visee did attempt to alien, his estate should cease, as if he 

 were naturally dead. Is it said there that the words, as if 

 he were naturally dead, shall be void, and the words, that 

 his estate shall cease, good ? No, but the whole clause shall 

 be void. And it is all one reason of a so that, as of an as 

 if, for they both suspend the sentence. 



So if I make a lease for life, upon condition he shall not 

 alien, nor take the profits, shall this be good for the first 

 part, and void for the second ? No, but it shall be void for 



So if the power of declaration of uses had been thus 

 penned, that Sir John Stanhope might by his deed indented 

 declare new uses, so that the deed were inrolled before the 

 mayor of St. Albans, who hath no power to take inrolments ; 

 or so that the deed were made in such sort, as might not 

 be made void by parliament : in all these and the like cases 

 the impossibility of the last part doth strike upwards, and 

 infect, and destroy the whole clause. And therefore, that 

 all the words may stand, is the first and true course ; that 

 all the words be void, is the second and probable ; but that 

 the revoking part should be good, and the assuring part 

 void, hath neither truth nor probability. 



Now come I to the second point, how this value should 

 be measured, wherein methinks you are as ill a measurer of 

 values as you are an expounder of words ; which point I 

 will divide, first considering what the law doth generally 

 intend by the word value ; and secondly to see what spe 

 cial words may be in these clauses, either to draw it to a 



