30G THE JURISDICTION OF THE MARCHES. 



either to usage or instructions ; and therefore it was neces 

 sary that the whole frame of those courts, and their autho 

 rity both for judicature and execution, should be described 

 and expressed by parliament. So was it of the authority 

 of the justices of Wales in the statute of 34 mentioned, 

 because there are many ordinances de novo concerning 

 them ; so that it was a new erection, and not a confirmation 

 of them. 



Thus have I, in confutation of their reasons, greatly, as 

 I conceive, confirmed our own, as it were with new matter ; 

 for most of that they have said made for us. But as I am 

 willing to clear your judgments, in taking away the objec 

 tions, so I must farther pray in aid of your memory for 

 those things which we have said, whereunto they have 

 offered no manner of answer ; for unto all our proofs which 

 we made touching the intent of the statute, which they 

 grant to be the spirit and life of this question, they said 

 nothing : as not a word to this ; That otherwise the word 

 marches in the statute should be idle or superfluous : not 

 a word to this ; That the statute doth always omit the word 

 marches in things that concern only Wales : not a word to 

 this ; That the statute did not mean to innovate, but to 

 ratify, and therefore if the shires were in before, they are 

 in still : not a word to the reason of the commixed govern 

 ment, as that it was necessary for the reclaiming of Wales 

 to have them conjoined with the shires; that it was neces 

 sary for commerce and contracts, and properly for the ease 

 of the subjects of Wales against the inhabitants of the 

 shires ; that it was not probable that the parliament meant 

 the prince should have no jurisdiction civil in that place, 

 where he kept his house. To all these things, which we 

 esteem the weightiest, there is alticm silentium, after the 

 manner of children that skip over where they cannot spell. 



Now to pass from the intent to the word ; first, I will 

 examine the proofs they have brought that the word was 

 used in their sense after the statute 27 and 34 ; then I will 

 consider what is gained, if they should prove so much : and, 

 lastly, I will briefly state our own proofs, touching the use 

 of the word. 



For the first, it hath been said, that whereas I called the 

 use of the word marches, after the statute of 27, but a little 

 chime at most of an old word, which soon after vanished, 

 they will now ring us a peal of statutes to prove it ; but if 

 it be a peal, I am sure it is a peal of bells, and not a peal 



