READING ON THE STATUTE OF USES. 319 



3. A right in law. 



And so much of the nature and definition of a use. 



It followeth to consider the parts and properties of a The parts and 

 use : wherein it appeareth by the consent of all books, and properties of a 

 it was distinctly delivered by Justice Walmsley in 36 of us 

 Elizabeth : That a trust consisteth upon three parts. 



The first, that the feoffee will suffer the feoffor to take The parts. 

 the profits. 



The second, that the feoffee upon request of the feoffor, 

 or notice of his will, will execute the estates to the feoffor, 

 or his heirs, or any other at his direction. 



The third, that if the feoffee be disseised, and so the 

 feoffor disturbed, the feoffee will reenter, or bring an action 

 to recontinue the possession ; for that those three, per- 

 nancy of profits, execution of estates, and defence of the 

 land, are the three points of the trust. 



For the properties of a use, they are exceedingly well The properties, 

 set forth by Fenner, justice, in the same case; and they be 

 three : 



1. Uses, saith he, are created by confidence: 



2. Preserved by privity, which is nothing else but a con 

 tinuance of the confidence, without interruption : and 



3. Ordered and guided by conscience : either by the 

 private conscience of the feoffee, or the general conscience 

 of the realm, which is chancery. 



The two former of which, because they be matters more 

 thoroughly beaten, and we shall have occasion hereafter to 

 handle them, we will not now dilate upon : 



But the third we will speak somewhat of; both because 

 it is a key to open many of the true reasons and learnings 

 of uses, and because it tendeth to decide our great and 

 principal doubts at this day, 



Coke, solicitor, entering into his argument of Chudleigh s 

 case, said sharply and fitly : &quot; I will put never a case but it 

 shall be of a use, for a use in law hath no fellow ;&quot; mean 

 ing, that the learning of uses is not to be matched with 

 other learnings. And Anderson, chief justice, in the argu 

 ment of the same case, did truly and profoundly control the 

 vulgar opinion collected upon 5 E. IV. that there might be 5 E. 4. 7. 

 possessio fratris of a use ; for he said, that it was no more 

 but that the chancellor would consult with the rules of law, 

 where the intention of the parties did not specially appear ; 

 and therefore the private conceit, which Glanvile, justice, 

 cited in the 42 Reginse, in the case of Corbet and Corbet, 1 Rep. 88. 

 in the Common Pleas, of one of Lincoln s Inn, whom he 



